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Abstract
We identify a common default risk premia (DRP) factor in the risk-adjusted
excess returns on pure default-contingent claims. Asset pricing tests using
almost 50 corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating, maturity or industry
suggest that the DRP factor is priced in the corporate bond market. For
index put option portfolios sorted on maturity and moneyness, both average
returns and DRP beta estimates become more negative with decreasing time
to maturity. There is little to no evidence of the DRP factor being priced
in equity markets. Most of the variation in DRP is explained by the portion
DRPJtD due to common jump-to-default risk premia. A theoretical framework
where DRPJtD is part of the pricing kernel supports our empirical ﬁndings.
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Recent empirical studies in ﬁnancial economics suggest that the price for bearing
exposure to U.S. corporate default risk, after controlling for expected default losses,
is substantial and that it varies dramatically over short horizons of time. Driessen
(2005) ﬁnds that instantaneous risk-neutral default probabilities are 1.8 times higher
than their rating-based counterparts. He assumes that a ﬁrm’s default probability is
the average historical default frequency of ﬁrms with the same credit rating. Berndt,
Douglas, Duﬃe, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005) and Saita (2006) use ﬁrm-speciﬁc
estimates of conditional physical default probabilities instead and estimate the median
ratio of risk-neutral to physical default intensities to be 2.0 and 3.7, respectively.
Berndt, Douglas, Duﬃe, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005) show that for a given default
probability, credit spreads exhibit substantial time variation. They peaked in the
third quarter of 2002 and then declined steadily and dramatically through late 2003
to roughly 50% of the value at their peak.1
If credit markets are close to being in equilibrium most of the time, any preference-
based asset pricing theory will predict that investors demand risk premia on traded
assets to compensate for bearing systematic risk. While investor preferences might
change over time, it is quite unlikely that they would change dramatically enough
over short horizons to induce a time variation in observed default risk premia of the
magnitude reported in the aforementioned studies. Alternatively, investors might
demand higher compensation for being more exposed to certain systematic factors
which suddenly become more important relative to other systematic factors.
This is the ﬁrst paper to extract a common risk factor from credit markets and
investigate its contribution towards explaining average returns observed in corporate
bond, equity and index option markets. Our data consist of weekly at-market credit
default swap (CDS) rates provided by Markit for 112 ﬁrms from 9 diﬀerent industries,
ranging from January 2002 to October 2006. We use these observation to estimate,
for each ﬁrm and week, the price of a pure default-contingent claim that pays one
unit of account if default does not occur before the maturity of the contract (in
our applications, one year), and zero otherwise. We form a credit-market portfolio
consisting of these pure credit-contingent claims, equally-weighted across all ﬁrms
in our sample. The sample correlations between the weekly excess returns on this
credit-market portfolio and the three stock-market factors MKT, SMB and HML
in Fama and French (1993) are 0.22, 0.21 and 0.16, respectively. To investigate the
1Berndt and Obreja (2007) discover similar ﬁndings for European credit markets.
2marginal contribution of a new credit-market risk factor, we identify that portion of
the weekly excess returns on the credit-market portfolio that cannot be explained by
linear combinations of systematic risk factors. We refer to it as the default risk premia
factor, or simply the DRP factor. Besides the Fama-French stock-market factors we
also control for the momentum factor introduced by Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) and
the TERM factor in Fama and French (1993) which proxies the common risk in bond
returns that arises from unexpected changes in interest rates. The systematic risk
factors explain 25% of weekly realized excess returns on the credit-market portfolio.
At the ﬁrm level, between 4% and 59% of the excess returns on pure default-contingent
claims can be associated with known systematic risk factors. For the median ﬁrm in
our sample, 20.4% of the variation in the residuals can be attributed to the DRP
factor.
Results using Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond indices generated from actual
transaction prices of actively traded issues suggest that the DRP factor is priced
in the corporate bond market. A cross-sectional analysis of Merrill Lynch corporate
bond portfolios, sorted on industry, maturity or rating, supports these ﬁndings. We
also construct 16 portfolios of delta-hedged European put options written on the S&P
500 index, sorted on moneyness and maturity. We ﬁnd that both average returns and
the beta estimates for our default risk premia factor become more negative as time to
maturity decreases. Although less pronounced, a similar overall trend can be observed
along the moneyness dimension for portfolios of ﬁrst- and of second-to-expire index
put options. The DRP factor contributes little towards explaining the time variation
in equity portfolio returns.
To further test the hypothesis that DRP is a priced factor, we implement the two-
pass procedure in Fama and MacBeth (1973) using a total of 214 test assets from all
three markets. In particular, we include the IG and HY Bloomberg-NASD corporate
bond portfolios, a total of 47 Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios, the 100 Fama
and French equity portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market, the 49 Fama and
French industry equity portfolios, and the 16 index put options portfolios sorted on
moneyness and time to maturity. Our results show that the weekly risk premia on the
DRP factor is about 3 basis points, and that this estimate is statistically signiﬁcant.
In order to account for the possibility that some of the co-movement in risk-
adjusted excess returns on pure default-contingent claims is due to reasons other
than the common variation in covariances, we also test for ﬁrm characteristics such
as the ﬁrm’s default probability and recovery rate, its leverage ratio and implied
volatility. We ﬁnd that the common variation in default risk premia is not likely to
3be due to these ﬁrm characteristics.
To oﬀer additional insights into our empirical ﬁndings we use estimates of condi-
tional default probabilities provided by Moody’s KMV to decompose the DRP factor
into a portion associated with common changes in expected default losses (DRP L),
a portion due to common variation in jump-to-default risk premia (DRP JtD), and
a portion due to common variation in the market price of default risk (DRP MPR).
For our model speciﬁcation, the ﬁrst two components account for most of the time
variation in the DRP factor, with R2’s ranging between 87% for the ﬁrst quarter
of 2003 and almost 100% during the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 and the second quarter of
2005. For corporate bonds, the loadings on DRP JtD are statistically signiﬁcant and
increase with increasing average excess returns, indicating that market-wide jump to
default risk is priced in the corporate bond market. For the equity portfolios, none
of the factors by themselves appear to be signiﬁcant in explaining the time variation
of returns. For the index put options, the DRP JtD factor is estimated consistently
to have the correct (negative) sign. The beta estimates line up with average excess
returns within each moneyness bin. They are estimated to be lower (more negative)
for out-of-the-money options than for at-the-money contracts. For short-term index
put options, both average returns and the loadings on DRP L become more negative
as options move out of the money. With regard to the cross-sectional results, weekly
risk premia on DRP L, DRP JtD and DRP MPR are estimates to be 1, 2 and 1 basis
points, respectively. The latter two are signiﬁcant at the 5%-level.
Next, we develop a theoretical framework in which DRP JtD arises naturally in the
pricing kernel and show that it captures the jump-to-default risk premia associated
with market-wide credit events. Within this framework, unlike risk premia on corpo-
rate bonds and index put options, equity risk premia are only marginally aﬀected by
DRP JtD. This result is based on the observation that DRP JtD has a much stronger
impact on the returns of assets with a non-degenerate payoﬀ structure in the default
states.
Finally, we address the practical issue of building trading strategies based on the
DRP factor. The pure default-contingent claims used to construct the DRP factor
are not actually traded. To give the reader a sense of how a trading strategy based
on the same motivation as for our default risk premia factor could be implemented,
we compute an alternative CDS-based DRP factor, named CDRP, by replacing the
holding returns on pure default-contingent claims by negative changes in logarithmic
default swap rates. Although with diﬀerent magnitudes, similar conclusions can be
drawn from asset pricing tests that use CDRP and its components.
4Related Literature
Fama and French (1993), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Elton,
Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), among others, have shown that systematic stock-
market factors are insuﬃcient to explain returns on corporate bonds. The ﬁrst paper
introduces a corporate bond market factor DEF to account for shifts in economic
conditions that change the price of default risk. It is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the return on a portfolio of long-term corporate bonds and the long-term government
bond return. Because returns on corporate bonds are contaminated by tax and liq-
uidity eﬀects (see, for example, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), Delianedis
and Geske (2001) and Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005)), DEF is not a clean mea-
sure of the reward for exposure to default risk. Our DRP factor, on the other hand, is
constructed exclusively using pricing information from credit markets and should be a
better measure of the return on default risk. We disentangle DEF into default-related
components (DRP L, DRP JtD and DRP MPR) and a non-default-related component
to gain additional insights into the pricing of diﬀerent classes of assets.
A number of papers have studied whether default risk is priced in equity markets.
They diﬀer in the choice of variables used to predict bankruptcy and the methodology
employed to estimate the likelihood of default. The Altman Z-score (Altman (1968))
and Ohlson O-score (Ohlson (1980)) are based on accounting variables and have
emerged as popular measures of ﬁnancial distress. They are used, for example, by
Dichev (1998), Griﬃn and Lemmon (2002) and Ferguson and Shockley (2003) to
explore the risk and average return of distressed ﬁrms. Vassalou and Xing (2004)
and Da and Gao (2005) rely on the distance to default, an asset-volatility-adjusted
leverage measure of the ﬁrm. More recently, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2007)
construct their own empirical measure of ﬁnancial distress by estimating a dynamic
panel model using a logit speciﬁcation. Except for Vassalou and Xing (2004), these
studies generally ﬁnd that the equity market has not properly priced distress risk.
Our approach diﬀers from this body of literature in that instead of sorting portfolios
on estimates for actual default risk, we construct a risk factor that is based on returns
observed in credit markets. Focusing only on expected default losses only ignores the
eﬀect of jump-to-default risk on asset returns, which we identify to be important
when pricing corporate bonds and index put options.
To date only a few papers have investigated whether jump-to-default risk is priced,
and the existing studies focus on solving the credit spread level (and volatility) puzzle.
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) propose a reduced-form model where
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spreads. While this framework is consistent with a counterparty risk interpretation
as in Jarrow and Yu (2001), it is more naturally interpreted as an updating of beliefs
due to unexpected events. Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2006) use a structural
jump-diﬀusion ﬁrm model with systematic and ﬁrm-speciﬁc jumps to generate option-
implied jump-risk premia. By means of a calibration exercise, the authors show that
incorporating option-implied jump risk premia brings predicted credit spread levels
much closer to observed levels. Amato and Remolona (2005) argue that idiosyncratic
jump-to-default risk is highly priced in the corporate bond market because there are
not enough liquid names to allow investors to signiﬁcantly diversify that risk in the
sense of Jarrow, Lando, and Yu (2005). They point to the fact that credit indices
have only 125 names and argue that there is so much skewness in bond returns that
idiosyncratic risk may be diﬃcult to diversify with exposure to less than 500 corporate
issuers. In contrast, Saita (2006) documents that there is ample compensation in
corporate debt portfolios for skewness and kurtosis, in part because there are indeed
signiﬁcant opportunities for diversiﬁcation even in moderately sized portfolios, and
in part because of the large compensation for the individual issuer risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our
data, comprised of credit default swap rates, Moody’s KMV EDF estimates for ac-
tual default probabilities, OptionMetrics option pricing information and other ac-
counting and market price data. Section 3 introduces our measure of model-implied
holding-period returns on pure default-contingent claims, and Section 4 presents a
methodology for extracting a latent common factor from the associated ﬁrm-speciﬁc
risk-adjusted excess returns. Section 5 describes our results from the asset pricing
tests, and Section 6 takes a closer look at the DRP components. Section 7 proposes
a the theoretical framework of the relevant pricing kernel that is consistent with our
empirical ﬁndings, and Section 8 summarizes our ﬁndings and discusses an alternative
DRP factor that can be traded.
2 Data
This section describes our data sources for (i) default swap rates, (ii) conditional
default probabilities, (iii) returns on equity, option and corporate bond portfolios,
and (iv) ﬁrm characteristics.
62.1 Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps (CDS) are over-the-counter credit derivatives that provide bond
insurance. Fueled by participation from commercial banks, insurance companies,
and hedge funds, CDS markets have grown exponentially over the past ten years,
reaching an estimated outstanding notional value of more than $34.4 trillion dollars in
2006.2 The buyer of protection in a CDS contract pays a quarterly insurance premium
until the expiration of the contract or until default by the reference entity, whichever
occurs ﬁrst. In return, the seller of protection pays to the buyer of protection the
diﬀerence between the face value and the market value of the referenced debt. This
compensation can be through physical delivery or cash delivery, with the former being
more common.
For our data, default events are triggered by bankruptcy, failure by the obligor
to make payments on its debt, or a debt restructuring that is materially adverse
to the interests of the creditors. For the latter, the “modiﬁed” ISDA contractual
standards apply. In the case of physical settlement, modiﬁed debt restructuring
restricts deliverable obligations to have a maturity within 30 months of the CDS
contract’s maturity. This signiﬁcantly decreases heterogeneity at a debt restructuring
event in the maturity, and hence the market value, of the various deliverables.
CDS rates are quoted as annualized percentages of the notional value of the
debt covered. Using an actual 360-day convention, they are equal to four times the
quarterly premia. Default swap data are provided by Markit and consist of weekly
(Wednesday) 1-year and 5-year at-market CDS rates for senior-unsecured U.S. dollar-
denominated debt with modiﬁed restructuring. Here, “at-market” denotes the pre-
mium rate at which the market value of the CDS contract at initiation is equal to zero.
Our observations are for 112 ﬁrms from 9 diﬀerent industries, including 9 ﬁrms from
the Basic Materials sector, 15 Consumer Goods ﬁrms, 9 Consumer Services ﬁrms, 14
Health Care ﬁrms, 17 Industrials ﬁrms, 17 Oil and Gas ﬁrms, 8 Technology ﬁrms, 9
Telecommunications ﬁrms, and 14 Utilities. The sample period ranges from January
2, 2001 to October 11, 2006, with a total of 250 weeks. Table 1 in Appendix A
lists the ﬁrms covered in our sample, sorted by industry. For the median ﬁrm, the
average 1-year and 5-year CDS rates are 41 and 68 basis points, respectively. It has
250 weekly 5-year CDS observations, and 247 1-year CDS observations. Figure 1
shows the distribution of median Moody’s senior rating during the sample period. It
2According to the ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) market survey avail-
able at http://www.isda.org/statistics/historical.html.
























Figure 1: Distribution of ﬁrms by median Moody’s senior rating during the sample
period. Source: Moody’s DRS.
indicates that the range of credit scores of the included ﬁrms is concentrated around
medium credit quality, with the majority of the ﬁrms having a Baa rating. Credit
ratings at the ﬁrm level were obtained from Moody’s Default Risk Service (DRS)
data base.
Figure 7 in Appendix A displays the time series of median recovery rates by
industry as reported by Markit, for each week in our sample period. We ﬁnd that there
is little variation over time in the magnitude of the recovery rates, with median sector
recovery rates ranging between 36% and 45%. At the ﬁrm level, a similar observation
regarding the limited amount of time variation for recovery rates holds true. Our
understanding from conversations with Markit is that the reported recoveries are
indicative of the values used by their contributors when pricing CDS contracts. We
therefore compute ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates for the risk-neutral mean fractional loss
given default as one minus the average of the recovery rates reported by Markit over
the sample period.
The CDS data used in this study are composites. Markit re-distribution rules
stipulate that there are at least three contributors to each composite quote.3 The
median ﬁrm in our sample has 10 contributors for the 5-year CDS rate quotes. Fig-
ure 2 plots the distribution of ﬁrms by median number of quote contributors. In our
sample, the median ﬁrm has a sample median of 10 contributors for the 5-year CDS
rate quotes.
3See http://www.markit.com for further details on the CDS pricing data.




























Figure 2: Distribution of ﬁrms by median number of quote contributors during the
sample period. Source: Markit.
2.2 EDF Data
We use one-year EDF
TM
(Expected Default Frequency) data provided by Moody’s
KMV as our estimates of conditional actual default probabilities. The concept of the
EDF measure is based on the structural credit risk framework of Black and Scholes
(1973) and Merton (1974). In these models, equity is viewed as a call option on the
ﬁrm’s asset value, with the strike price being equal to the liabilities of the ﬁrm. The
“distance-to-default”, deﬁned as the number of standard deviations of asset growth
by which its assets exceed a measure of book liabilities, is a suﬃcient statistic of the
likelihood of default. In the EDF release underlying the default probabilities used in
this study, the liability measure is equal to the ﬁrm’s short-term book liabilities plus
one half of its long-term book liabilities. EDF values are reported with a ﬂoor of 2
basis points and a cap of 20%.4
The Moody’s KMV EDF measure is extensively used in the ﬁnancial services in-
dustry as most of the world’s 100 largest ﬁnancial institutions are subscribers. Crosbie
and Bohn (2001) and Kealhofer (2003) provide more details on the model implemen-
tation and the ﬁtting procedures for distance to default and EDF. Moody’s KMV
uses a non-parametric mapping from the distance to default to EDF that is based on
a rich history of actual defaults, where the same deﬁnition of a default event is used
4The forthcoming EDF 8.0 release expands the range of meaningful EDF values by lowering the
ﬂoor to 1 bp and by raising the cap to 35%. For more details, refer to http://www.moodyskmv.com.
9as for our default swap data.5 The EDF measure is therefore less sensitive to model
mis-speciﬁcation. The accuracy of the EDF measure as a predictor of default, and
its superior performance compared to rating-based default prediction, is documented
in Bohn, Arora, and Korbalev (2005). Duﬃe, Saita, and Wang (2007) propose a
default prediction model in which they construct their own measure of distance to
default and include other covariates such as the trailing 1-year stock return of the
ﬁrm, the current 3-month Treasury rate, and the trailing 1-year return of the S&P
500. The authors ﬁnd that the variation in their distance-to-default measure has a
substantially greater eﬀect on future default hazard rates when compared to a simi-
larly signiﬁcant change in any of the other covariates, suggesting that EDF is a useful
proxy for the physical probability of default.
We obtain weekly (Wednesday) one-year EDF rates from Moody’s KMV, for the
same set of ﬁrms and for the same time period as described in Section 2.1. Table 1
in Appendix A provides summary statistics for the EDF data at the ﬁrm level. The
median ﬁrm in our sample has 247 weekly 1-year EDF observations, and an average
1-year EDF rate of 24 basis points. Figure 3 shows the time series of the median
1-year EDF rates across all ﬁrms in our sample, together with the median 1-year and
5-year CDS rates. Both EDF and CDS rates vary considerably over time. EDF rates
peaked during the third quarter of 2002 and then declined steadily until the end of
our sample period in October 2006. The temporal pattern of CDS rates looks similar,
with an additional spike in default swap premia shortly after the Ford and General
Motors downgrade in May 2005.
2.3 Returns on Equity, Option and Corporate Bond Portfo-
lios
We obtain daily data on Fama-French portfolios and the stock-market factors from
Kenneth French’s website. Daily returns are compounded from Wednesday to Wednes-
day to obtain weekly returns.
We also collect return information for the investment-grade (IG) and high-yield
(HY) Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond indices.6 Rebalanced on a monthly basis,
5This is diﬀerent from the Merton model, where the likelihood of default is the inverse of the
normal cumulative distribution function of distance to default.
6The name of these indices has recently been changed to FINRA-Bloomberg Corporate Bond
Indicies. FINRA stands for Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and was created in July
2007 through the consolidation of NASD and the member regulation, enforcement and arbitration
functions of the New York Stock Exchange.























Figure 3: Time series of median 5-year and 1-year CDS rates, and of median 1-year EDF
rates across the 112 ﬁrms in Table 1. Sources: Markit and Moody’s KMV.
these indices are comprised of the most frequently traded ﬁxed-coupon bonds repre-
sented by NASD’s TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), which collects
and publicly disseminates transaction data on all over-the-counter activity in the sec-
ondary corporate bond market.7 Bloomberg-NASD indices are the ﬁrst and to our
knowledge the only corporate bond indices generated solely from the actual transac-
tion prices of actively traded bonds, and do not rely on any quotes or estimated prices.
We compute holding-period returns using weekly (Wednesday) index prices that we
download from the NASD website at www.nasdbondinfo.com. The Bloomberg-NASD
indices are calculated as of 5:15 p.m every trading day. On October 11, 2006, there
were 720 bond issues of 161 ﬁrms in the NBBI index, and 259 issues of 127 ﬁrms
in the NBBH index. Using the SIC industry classiﬁcations, the majority of ﬁrms in
the IG index belong to the manufacturing industry (41%), to Transportation Com-
munications Electric Gas and Sanitary Services (TCEGSS, 21%), and to the ﬁnance,
insurance, and real estate sector (23%). For the high-yield index, the members’
industry distribution is somewhat diﬀerent, with 11%, 41%, 23% and 15% of the
corporations represented belonging to the mining-and-construction, manufacturing,
7Index membership is comprised of TRACE-eligible ﬁxed-coupon corporate bonds, excluding all
zero coupon bonds, 144As, convertible bonds, and bonds set to mature before the last day of the
month for which index re-balance occurs. All bonds must have traded on average at least 3 times
per day, with at least one trade on 80% of the 60 trading days prior to the re-balance calculation
date, and have a total issued amount outstanding available publicly.
11TCEGSS, and the services sector, respectively.
Furthermore, we obtain weekly return data for Merrill Lynch corporate bond port-
folios. Using Datastream as our source, we download 7 portfolios sorted on Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) credit rating (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and C), 6 portfolios sorted
on time to maturity (1-3yrs, 3-5yrs, 5-7yrs, 7-10yrs, 10-15yrs and more than 15yrs),
4 IG portfolios sorted on broad industry (Industrials BBB-A 1-10yrs, Banks BBB-A
1-10yrs, Financials AA-AAA 1-10yrs, and Gas and Electrics BBB-A 1-10yrs), and
30 HY industry portfolios.8 All corporate bond returns are available throughout our
sample period from January 2, 2002 until October 11, 2006, except the Bloomberg-
NASD indices which are available only starting October 2002 (index initiation) to
September 2005.
Using OptionMetrics as our source for option data, we form portfolios of Euro-
pean put options written on the S&P 500 index based on moneyness and time to
maturity. We deﬁne moneyness as the present value of the strike price divided by the
current value of the S&P 500 index. To form portfolios, we ﬁrst classify the options
into 4 maturity bins consisting of options that expire within one month (ﬁrst-to-
expire options), two months (second-to-expire options), three to ﬁve months (third to
ﬁfth-to-expire options), and more than ﬁve months. Options with less than 10 days
remaining until expiration are not used since trading at the very short end occurs
less frequently and bid and ask quotes are therefore less reliable. In a second step,
we split each maturity bin into 4 sub-bins based on moneyness. The deepest out-
of-the-money (OTM) bin consists of options with moneyness between 0.85 and 0.9,
followed by bins with moneyness ranging from 0.9 to 0.95, 0.95 to 1, and greater than
1. This results in 16 diﬀerent portfolios sorted on maturity and moneyness. Every
week (Wednesday) t, we assign each index put option to a particular bin based on its
maturity and moneyness as of that time, and compute Black-Scholes delta-hedged re-
turns as of one week later. The return of any particular maturity-moneyness portfolio
at time t + h, where h equals one week, is computed as the value-weighted average
of the buy-and-hold returns of all delta-hedged option positions associated with this
particular portfolio as of time t. Table 2 in Appendix A shows sample averages for
moneyness and time to maturity as well as the number of observations for each of
the 16 option portfolios. Average value-weighted portfolio excess returns are reported
in the ﬁrst part of Table 10 in Appendix C. When weighting returns by value, we
8The list of Datastream symbols for all ML portfolios is available from the authors upon request.
The mnemonic for each of the 30 HY industry portfolios begins with “MLHY”, followed by an
abbreviation for the industry.
12use market prices of the delta-hedged option positions as of time t to compute the
weights. Option prices are computed as daily mid prices, that is, the average of the
best bid and best oﬀer prices.
We restrict ourselves to options with standard settlement. To eliminate prices
with large errors, we only use observations that satisfy all of the following criteria:
both the bid and the oﬀer price are positive, the oﬀer price is at least as high as
the bid price, open interest is positive, the sum of the option price plus the spread
is at least as high as the intrinsic value, the mid price is at least as high as twice
the bid-ask spread, and the implied volatility is 1% or higher. The intrinsic value is
calculated as the larger of the present value of the strike price plus the present value
of future dividends minus the closing value of the S&P 500 index and zero. The price
of the option should exceed its intrinsic value based on no-arbitrage arguments. To
allow for non-synchronous reporting of the value of the underlying and of the option,
we use a looser constraint, and only require that the price plus spread exceeds the
intrinsic value. As in Jones (2006), we also use an implied volatility cutoﬀ to remove
options prices that appear suspect.
2.4 Firm Characteristics Data
The ﬁrm characteristics used in Section 5.5 include ﬁrm-level recovery rates, implied
volatilities and leverage ratios, all at a weekly (Wednesday) frequency. Recovery rates
at the ﬁrm level are provided by Markit and were described in Section 2.1. We use
the Standardized Options table in OptionMetrics to access ﬁrm-speciﬁc call-option-
implied volatilities with 30 days until expiration. Leverage is computed as book
liabilities divided by the market price of equity plus book liabilities. Book liabilities
are equal to short-term plus long-term debt, where short-term debt is estimated as the
larger of items DATA45 and DATA49 from the quarterly Compustat ﬁles. Long-term
liabilities are taken from item DATA51. After calculating the leverage ratios at the
end of each quarter, we interpolate to obtain leverage ratios at a weekly frequency.
The market value of equity is computed using the daily CRSP ﬁles. For each week
and every ﬁrm, we multiply the closing stock price (data item PRC) with the number
of outstanding shares recorded in millions (data item SHROUT divided by 1,000).
133 Measuring Returns on Defaultable Debt
This section describes how we measure the compensation that investors in U.S. credit
markets demand for taking on default risk. The goal is to compute, at the ﬁrm level,
holding-period returns on pure default-contingent claims that pay one unit of account
if default does not occur before the maturity of the contract (in our applications, 1
year), and zero otherwise. In the existing literature, pricing information for credit risk
has either been estimated using corporate bond prices or, more recently, CDS quotes.
Firm-by-ﬁrm time-series data on realized returns on corporate bonds is very sparse.9
Even if it were readily available, it is contaminated by tax and liquidity eﬀects (see,
for example, Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001)). The advantage of using
at-market CDS rates, on the other hand, is that each of our CDS observations is
eﬀectively a new constant-maturity par-coupon credit spread on the underlying ﬁrm
that is much less corrupted by tax and liquidity issues. It is therefore important to
stress that we exclusively use pricing information from the CDS market to estimate
returns on defaultable debt. We believe this yields a cleaner measure of the compen-
sation for exposure to default risk than can be extracted from corporate bond price
data.
We take as given a probability space (Ω,F,P) and an information ﬁltration {Ft :
t ≥ 0} that satisﬁes the usual conditions. The default intensity of a ﬁrm is the
instantaneous mean arrival rate of default, conditional on all current information.
More precisely, we suppose that default of an obligor occurs at the ﬁrst event time τ
of a (non-explosive) counting process N with intensity process λP, relative to (Ω,F,P)
and {Ft : t ≥ 0}. In this case, so long as the ﬁrm survives, we say that its default
intensity at time t is λP
t . Under mild technical conditions this implies that, given
survival to time t and all information available at t, the probability of default between
times t and t+∆ is approximately λP
t ∆ for small ∆. We adopt the simplifying doubly-
stochastic, or Cox-process, assumption under which the conditional probability at










Here, Et denotes expectation conditional on information available up to and including
time t.
9Time-series data on realized returns on corporate bonds at the issue level can be accessed via the
TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine), starting July 2002. In the secondary market,
the majority of corporate bonds trade only a few times a year on average.
14Under the absence of arbitrage and market frictions, and under mild technical
conditions, there exists a “risk-neutral” probability measure, also known as an “equiv-
alent martingale” measure, as shown by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Delbaen and
Schachermayer (1999). In our setting, markets should not be assumed to be com-
plete, so the martingale measure is not unique. This pricing approach nevertheless
allows us, under its conditions, to express the price at time t of a security paying








t rs ds Z
￿
, (2)
where r is the short-term interest-rate process and E
Q
t denotes expectation conditional
on information available up to and including time t with respect to an equivalent
martingale measure Q that we ﬁx.10 One may view (2) as the deﬁnition of such a
measure Q. The idea is that the actual (or physical) measure P and the risk-neutral
measure Q diﬀer by an adjustment for default risk premia.
We measure holding-period returns on pure default-contingent claims by compar-
ing the time-t price P(t,T−t) of a risky zero-coupon zero-recovery bond with maturity
T > t to the price of that same security one period h earlier. (Recall that h equals one





for all s and times to maturity ∆. If the ﬁrm has not defaulted by time t, the realized
holding-period return Rt,h(T) over an interval of length h is given by
Rt,h(T) =
P(t,T − t)























Throughout this paper we assume independence between the short-term interest rate
process and default times under the risk-neutral measure. Even though the magnitude
of the correlation is generally found to be negative (see, for example, Duﬀee (1998)),
we have veriﬁed that its role is negligible for our parameter estimates. This allows us
to rewrite the last equation as
Rt,h(T) =
d(t,T − t)





















￿ − 1, (3)
10Here, r is a progressively measurable process with
R t
0 |rs|ds < ∞ for all t, such that there exists
a “money-market” trading strategy, allowing investment at any time t of one unit of account, with
continual re-investment until any future time T, with a ﬁnal value of e
R T
t rs ds.




t rs ds) is the default-free market discount factor.
Given Rt,h(T), we are now in a position to compute risk-adjusted excess returns
on pure default-contingent claims. In Section 4, we extract our default risk premia
factor as the common component in these ﬁrm-speciﬁc returns, and we describe how
to decompose the DRP factor into three diﬀerent components. The ﬁrst component
captures changes in expected default losses, the second accounts for jump-to-default
risk premia, and the third is due to the market price of risk associated with random
ﬂuctuations in the risk-neutral default intensity (MPR). To isolate the ﬁrst compo-
nent, we compute holding-period returns RPP
t,h (T) that would have applied in the






















￿ − 1. (4)
The ﬁrst P in the double-P superscript for the return variable indicates that there is
no jump-to-default risk premia, in other words that λQ in (3) is replaced by λP. The
second P in the superscript points to the fact that the market price of risk associated
with random ﬂuctuations in the risk-neutral default intensity is set to zero, implying
that the survival probabilities in (3) should now be computed under the P measure.
To separate the MPR component, we compare Rt,h(T) to model-implied holding-
period returns R
QP
t,h (T) that would have applied if only the market price of risk as-
sociated with random ﬂuctuations in the risk-neutral default process was turned oﬀ.
























￿ − 1, (5)
where Q in the QP superscript is a reminder of the compensation for jump-to-default
risk premia, whereas P has the same interpretation of zero MPR as before.11 The
remaining component of the risk-adjusted excess returns on defaultable bonds, which
is due to jump-to-default risk premia, can be also be extracted from R
QP
t,h (T), after
accounting for changes in expected default losses using RPP
t,h (T). Details will be
provided in Section 4.
If pure default-contingent claims were actively traded, we could observe their
prices Pt,T−t directly and it would be possible to compute holding-period returns on
11According to this notation, Rt,h(T) in (3) could also be referred to as R
QQ
t,h (T). To keep notation
simple, we use the former.
16defaultable securities as in (3). As this is not the case, we proceed by estimating a
time-series model for λQ using CDS data, which enables us to compute model-implied
returns Rt,h(T) according to (3). As a by-product of the estimation, we also obtain
estimates for R
QP
t,h (T) in (5). Using Moody’s KMV EDF rates, we then follow a
similar procedure to estimate the model-implied returns RPP
t,h (T) in (4). Details on
the speciﬁcation of the time-series models for λP and λQ, as well as our estimation
techniques, are discussed in the next section.
4 Extracting the Default Risk Premia Factor
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the time-series models for both actual and risk-
neutral default intensities and explain our estimation procedure. Once the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc model-implied values for λQ and λP are obtained, in a second step we compute
estimates for the realized holding-period returns Rt,h(T) in (3). Next we explain how
to extract the DRP factor as the common component in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk-adjusted
excess returns on defaultable debt. Lastly, we turn our attention to decomposing the
DRP factor into components that are due to common changes in (i) expected default
losses, (ii) jump to default risk premia, and (iii) market price of default risk.
We specify a model under which the logarithm of a ﬁrm’s physical default intensity
λP
t satisﬁes the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equation
dlog(λ
P
t ) = κ(θ − log(λ
P
t ))dt + σdBt, (6)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, and θ, κ, and σ are constants to be es-
timated. The behavior of λP is called a Black-Karasinski (BK) model, according
to Black and Karasinski (1991). Berndt (2007) performs a diagnostic analysis of
the EDF data and shows that (6) oﬀers a good compromise between goodness-of-ﬁt
and model simplicity. The author uses non-parametric speciﬁcation tests developed
in Hong and Li (2005) to evaluate several one-factor reduced-form credit risk models
for actual default intensities. She ﬁnds that the BK speciﬁcation outperforms popular
aﬃne jump-diﬀusion models for λP, such as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck or Vasicek model
(Vasicek (1977)), the CIR model (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985)), and the CIR model
with jumps in Duﬃe and Garleanu (2001). For the BK default intensity model, there
is generally no closed-form solution available for 1-year EDFs, 1 − p(t,1), from (1).
We therefore compute p(t,1) numerically as a function of λP
t by implementing the
two-stage lattice-based Hull and White (1994) procedure for constructing trinomial
17trees.
Using the EDF data described in Section 2.2, we obtain sector-by-sector maximum-
likelihood estimates for κ and σ in (6), while allowing for a ﬁrm-speciﬁc long-run mean
parameter θi. (The superscript i is used to identify parameters speciﬁc to ﬁrm i.)
Sector-speciﬁc parameters have two important advantages over estimating a diﬀerent
set of parameters κi and σi for each ﬁrm i. First, it reduces the small-sample bias in
the MLE estimators, especially for the estimates of the mean-reversion parameter κ.
(Monte Carlo evidence to that eﬀect was given in Berndt, Douglas, Duﬃe, Ferguson,
and Schranz (2005), Appendix B.) Second, it allows us to model a joint distribution
of EDF rates across ﬁrms in a given industry sector. In particular, we impose joint
normality of the Brownian motions driving each ﬁrm’s default intensity, with a ﬂat
cross-ﬁrm correlation structure within the sector. In other words, for each ﬁrm i





















where Bc and Bi are independent standard Brownian motions, independent of {Bj}j6=i,
and ρ denotes the constant pairwise within-sector correlation coeﬃcient.







is not available because of missing data points, and because EDF rates are cen-
sored from above at 20%. Both issues are explicitly accounted for by using an EM
(Expectation-Maximization) algorithm with Gibbs sampling.12 As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.2, EDF rates are also truncated below at 2 basis points. To avoid the problem
of integer-based granularity in the EDFs for ﬁrms with exceptionally good credit
quality, we removed all ﬁrms with a sample average of 1-year EDFs of less than 5
basis points from the data set initially provided by Moody’s KMV. They are not part
of the 112 names in Table 1. The remaining 2-basis-point observations in our sample
are treated as “true” data points. Since the majority of the ﬁrms in our sample are of
median credit quality (see Figure 1), we do not expect this simpliﬁcation to introduce
any signiﬁcant bias to the parameter estimates.
Results are shown in Table 3 in Appendix B. To improve the interpretability
of our parameter estimates, we have imposed the overriding restriction that θQ,i is
12Details are available form the authors upon request. The Matlab code is available online at
www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/aberndt/software/.
18equal to the model-implied sample mean of logλ
P,i
t , for each ﬁrm i. The estimated
mean-reversion parameter is lowest for oil-and-gas ﬁrms at 10.9%, and highest for
consumer-goods ﬁrms at 120%, implying a half time of 6 years 4 months and of
7 months, respectively. Annualized volatilities, on the other hand, range between
96.3% for telecommunication ﬁrms and 157.4% for consumer-goods ﬁrms. Note that
the pairwise correlation among the log-default intensities is lowest for health-care
ﬁrms (17.2%) and almost twice that for utilities (33.5%).























t are independent standard Brownian motions with regard to the
physical measure P, independent of {BQ,j}j6=i. The parameters κQ,{θQi}, σQ and ρQ
are scalars to be estimated. The risk-neutral distribution of λQ,i is speciﬁed as
dlogλ
Q,i
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with constants ˜ κQ and ˜ θQ,i. ˜ B
Q,c
t and ˜ B
Q,i
t are independent standard Brownian mo-
tions with regard to Q, independent of { ˜ BQ,j}j6=i. The market-price-of-default-risk
process, Λi, characterizes the change in the drift parameter of dlogλ
Q,i
t when replacing
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Given a set of parameters (˜ θQ,i,˜ κQ,σQ) for ﬁrm i plus its risk-neutral loss-given-
default rate, we can compute 1-year and 5-year CDS rates as a function of λQ,i. Since
estimation of the model (8) and (9) is a necessity but not the focus of our paper,
we refer the reader to Section 5.1 in Berndt, Douglas, Duﬃe, Ferguson, and Schranz
(2005) for a detailed explanation of the computations involved. Note, however, that
we use ﬁrm-speciﬁc instead of industry-speciﬁc loss-given-default values as discussed
in Section 2.1 and listed, for each ﬁrm, in Table 1.
Based on 5-year CDS observations, we employ maximum likelihood estimation












19that govern the processes {λQ,i}. We impose two overriding conditions to improve the
interpretability of our parameter estimates. First, we make use of the term-structure
information contained in 1-year CDS rates to pin down the risk-neutral long-run-
mean parameters {˜ θQ,i}. In particular, given (˜ κQ,σQ), we determine ˜ θQ,i so that the
sample mean of the model-implied risk-neutral mean-loss rates for ﬁrm i is equal to
the sample mean of its 1-year CDS rates. Second, for each ﬁrm i, we set θQ,i equal to
the model-implied sample mean of logλ
Q,i
t . Note that in contrast to Berndt, Douglas,
Duﬃe, Ferguson, and Schranz (2005), we do not impose a functional form that links
risk-neutral to actual default intensities. Besides limiting our exposure to model mis-
speciﬁcations in that regard, it also allows us to estimate the parameters that drive
λQ and the parameters for λP in two separate MLE procedures.
Estimates for the parameters in (8) and (9) are listed in Table 4 in Appendix B. We
ﬁnd that the estimated mean-reversion parameters under the risk-neutral measure,
˜ κQ, are substantially smaller than their physical counterparts, κQ, except for ﬁrms
in the telecommunications sector. According to (8) and (9), dlogλ
Q,i
t has a drift
term that is higher under Q than under P whenever the market price of default risk
Λi
t in (10) is less than zero. For values of logλ
Q,i
t close to its long-run mean, this
holds true as long as ˜ κQ˜ θQ,i > ˜ κQθQ,i. This relationship is satisﬁed, on average,
for all industries in our sample except for the health-care and technology sectors.
Annualized volatilities range from 125.5% (Consumer Goods) to 183.6% (Consumer
Services, whereas within-sector correlations are estimated to be between 8.2% (Health
Care) and 35.5% (Telecommunications). For the majority of the sectors, estimates
for both σQ and ρQ are higher than for their physical counterparts.13
Figure 4 plots the time series of median yield spreads of pure default-contingent
claims with a maturity of one year, across all ﬁrms in our sample. Because we as-
sume independence between the short-term interest rate process and default times






s ds)]/∆. We ﬁnd that yield spreads peaked in the
third quarter of 2002, and then declined quite dramatically until the end of 2003.
They have stayed at fairly low levels since then. A second spike in default insur-
ance rates occurred, however, immediately after Ford and General Motors (GM) debt
was reduced to junk bond status in early May of 2005. We also compute the yield













t . It is a function of ρQ, σQ
and h only. A similar observation holds true for their physical counterparts. This implies that
within-sector correlations between risk-neutral default intensities are estimated to be higher than
correlations between actual default intensities.






























Figure 4: Time series of median yield spreads for pure default-contingent claims with a
maturity of one year, across all ﬁrms. s − sQP and sQP − sPP measure compensation for
exposure to diﬀusive default risk and to jump-to-default risk, respectively.
spreads sQP(t,∆) and sPP(t,∆) that would have applied if the market price of risk
associated with random ﬂuctuations in λQ was turned oﬀ and in the absence of any










ure 4 shows that the time series of sQP(t,1) follows that of s(t,1) closely, in particular
after the ﬁrst 15 months of our sample. According to (10), the drift parameter of
dlogλQ under Q increases relative to that under P as λQ increases (for all sectors
with ˜ κQ < κQ), which explains why s(t,1) is larger than sQP(t,1) during 2002 and
the ﬁrst quarter of 2003, when credit spreads were high. The yield spreads linked to
expected default losses, sPP(t,1), also peaked in the second half of 2002, and subse-
quently declined steadily to a median of about 4 basis points at the end of our sample.
Interestingly, we do not observe any signiﬁcant widening of conditional default rates
in May 2005, implying that the actual downgrade of Ford and GM did not lead to a
surprise reaction in EDFs.
Using the model-implied values for λ
Q
t , we can now compute estimates for the
realized holding-period returns Rt,h(T) in (3), which in turn enables us to compute
risk-adjusted excess returns on pure default-contingent claims. We will refer to the
latent common component in these ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk-adjusted excess returns as the
default risk premia factor, or simply the DRP factor. Let F S
t denote the vector
21of h-period returns on known systematic factors.14 Among the factors we account
for are those in Fama and French (1993), including their term (but not the default)
factor, and the momentum factor introduced by Jagadeesh and Titman (1993). Let
RFt denote the risk-free rate compounded over the interval [t − h,t] from the Fama-
French T-bill daily returns. Using superscript i to indicate returns speciﬁc to ﬁrm i,







t,h(T) − RFt = α + β
S · F
S
t + ￿t, (11)
where N is the number of ﬁrms in our sample. In our applications, h equals one week
and T = t − h + 1.
The residuals ￿t absorb any common variation in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk-adjusted ex-
cess returns on pure default-contingent claims that cannot be explained by linear
combinations of the systematic factors F S. If {ˆ α} and {ˆ ￿t} denote the least-squares
estimates for (11), the default risk premia factor is given by
DRPt = ˆ α + ˆ ￿t. (12)
Figure 5 plots the time series of the DRP factor. It shows that most of the time
variation occurs during January and February of 2002 (a record amount of corporate
debt fell into default the ﬁrst month of 2002, led by Kmart and Global Crossing), the
second half of 2002 (following the Worldcom scandal), and in May 2005 (in response
to the Ford and General Motors downgrade to junk status). This is in line with our
observations in Figure 4.
In Section 5, we use the time series of returns on the DRP factor and employ the
Fama-MacBeth methodology to test whether this factor is priced in the cross-section
of corporate bond, option and stock returns. We oﬀer additional insights into our
empirical ﬁndings by decomposing the DRP factor into three diﬀerent components.








where DRP L is the portion associated with common changes in expected default
losses, DRP JtD accounts for common changes in jump-to-default risk premia and
DRP MPR captures the common variation in the market price of default risk.
To this end, we ﬁrst compute ﬁrm-speciﬁc estimates for RPP
t,h (T) in (4) and for
14To simplify notation, we suppress the reference to h and T in the return variables.




























Figure 5: Time series of the DRP factor as extracted from (11) and (12), together with
the DRPPP and DRPQP processes.
R
QP
t,h (T) in (5). Let DRP PP denote the latent common component of risk-adjusted
excess returns on defaultable bonds that would have applied in the absence of any risk
premia related to default. Likewise, let DRP QP be the latent common component
if only the market price of default risk were turned oﬀ (but not the jump-to-default




t,h (T) and R
QP,i
t,h (T), respectively. Figure 5 shows the time
series of DRP PP and DRP QP in comparison with DRP. We ﬁnd that DRP PP
displays a large amount of time variation only at the beginning of our sample period,
and that DRP QP tracks DRP quite closely, especially after the ﬁrst quarter of 2003.
Note that the latter is not surprising given the evidence in Figure 4.
To further scrutinize how much of the time variation in the common component
of risk-adjusted excess returns on defaultable debt can be explained without the
help of any risk premia related to the default event, we compute the coeﬃcient of
determination when regressing DRP on DRP PP, for each quarter in our sample. The
results are displayed in Figure 6. They indicate that DRP PP captures almost 95% of
the variation in DRP in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002, with conﬁrms the conclusions drawn
based on Figure 5. For the rest of the sample period, however, DRP PP explains a
substantially smaller percentage, with a median of 24%. When controlling for DRP QP
in addition to DRP PP, we are able to account for most of the time variation in the
DRP factor, with R-squares ranging between 87% for the ﬁrst quarter of 2003 and
almost 100% during the ﬁrst quarter of 2002 and the second quarter of 2005. This
























Figure 6: Portion of variation explained by quarter. Blue bars show the coeﬃcient of
determination when regressing DRP on DRPPP, whereas the sum of the blue plus the red
bar equals the R2 from regressing DRP on both DRPPP and DRPQP. Green bars equal
the amount of variation in DRP that cannot be explained by DRPPP and DRPQP.
implies that, for most of our sample period, jump-to-default risk premia account for
the main portion of the time variation in DRP.15 For the model speciﬁcation in (10),
variation in the market price of default risk only makes a minor marginal contribution
towards explaining risk-adjusted excess returns on the 1-year pure default-contingent
claims considered here.16 It accounts for an average 5% of the time variation during
the ﬁrst 15 months of our sample, and for an average of only 1% in the remaining
quarters, which is consistent with the observations in Figures 4 and 5.
Having identiﬁed both DRP PP and DRP QP in addition to DRP allows us to
deﬁne DRP JtD = DRP QP−DRP PP and DRP MPR = DRP −DRP QP. With DRP L
equal to DRP PP, equation (13) follows. Based on the ﬁndings in Figure 6, instead of
performing asset pricing tests that use all three components in (13) simultaneously,






where DRP −L = DRP − DRP PP = DRP JtD + DRP MPR is the common compo-
nent in risk-adjusted excess returns on defaultable debt after accounting for common
15Note that height of the second bar in Figure 6 is not necessarily equal to the amount of variation
explained by DRP QP alone. The reason is that DRP PP and DRP QP are likely to exhibit non-zero
within-quarter correlations.
16For small values of h we have DRP PP ≈ −BPPλP, DRP QP −DRP PP ≈ −(BQPλQ−BPPλP),
and DRP −DRP QP ≈ −(B −BQP)λQ for some positive constants BPP, BQP and B. Hence, with
regard to the time variation in DRP, most of the information is contained in DRP L and DRP JtD.
24changes in expected default losses.
5 Asset Pricing Tests
In this section, we investigate whether the common variation in risk-adjusted excess
returns on pure default-contingent claims with a maturity of one year, as captured by
our DRP factor in (12), is priced in the cross-section of asset returns. We do so using
one of two approaches. The ﬁrst method, referred to as (M1), is designed for small sets
of test assets. It simply inspects the relationship between the time-series loadings on
the DRP factor and the average returns on the test assets, in the spirit of Fama and
French (1993). The second method, labeled (M2), implements Fama-MacBeth two-
pass approaches to estimating beta-pricing models (see Fama and MacBeth (1973)).
It relies on large sets of test assets.
In principle, test assets should have two important features. First, they are sup-
posed to be representative of all capital markets, and second they should exhibit
a high degree of variation in average returns. The ﬁrst condition is important in
deﬁning the generality of the test, while the second feature ensures that the cross-
section of expected returns is suﬃciently rich. As a compromise between meeting
these conditions and data availability, we focus on a set of test assets that consists
of the 100 Fama-French portfolios formed on size and book-to-market equity, the 49
Fama-French equity portfolios sorted on industry, the investment-grade and the high-
yield Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond portfolio, plus a total number of 47 Merrill
Lynch corporate bond portfolios. The latter include 7 portfolios sorted on S&P credit
ratings (AAA to C), 6 portfolios sorted by time to maturity (1-3yrs to more than
15yrs), as well as 30 HY and 4 IG portfolios sorted on industry. We also construct
16 portfolios of put options on the S&P 500 index sorted on time to maturity and
moneyness. For a more detailed description of these test portfolios and how they are
composed, refer to Section 2.3.
In Section 4, we decompose the systemic behavior of defaultable securities (DRP)
into portions associated with common changes in expected default losses (DRP L),
common changes in jump-to-default risk premia (DRP JtD), and common variation
in the market price of default risk (DRP MPR). The second component explains most
of the time variation in DRP (see Figure 6). Test assets which are likely to be
exposed to jump-to-default risk, such as corporate bonds and put options that are
(far) out of the money, should therefore load signiﬁcantly on DRP JtD, as well as on
DRP, in a time-series regressions. Using sets of corporate bond and put index option
25portfolios, we will implement (M1) to investigate whether the DRP factor is priced by
such assets. In particular, the sets of test assets include the two Bloomberg-NASD
corporate bond portfolios, the ML corporate bond portfolios sorted on rating, the
ML corporate bond portfolios sorted on time to maturity, the ML corporate bond
portfolios sorted on industry (both IG and HY), and the index put option portfolios
double-sorted on time to maturity and moneyness. For comparison, we also perform
time-series regressions for the Fama-French 100 equity portfolios sorted on size and
book-to-market. If we ﬁnd a set of test assets for which the average returns line up
with their DRP-factor loadings, it will be interpreted as evidence in support of the
hypothesis that the DRP factor is priced by the assets at hand.
To estimate the loadings on the default risk premia factor, we regress excess
returns of the test assets on DRP, after controlling for common factors that proxy
for macroeconomic risk. More formally, for each test asset i, we estimate the linear
model









DRPDRP(t) + ￿i(t). (15)
Ri(t) denotes the return on asset i over the time period [t − h,t], where h in our
applications is one week. As deﬁned in Section 4, RF(t) measures the risk-free rate,
compounded weekly from the Fama-French T-bill daily returns. MKT, SMB and
HML denote the three stock-market factors from Fama and French (1993), UMD is
the momentum factor deﬁned in Jagadeesh and Titman (1993), and TERM is the
label for the treasury bond market factor. The latter, together with the corporate
bond market factor DEF, was introduced in Fama and French (1993) as well.17 The
factor NDEF denotes that component of DEF that is orthogonal to DRP L, DRP JtD
and DRP MPR (and hence, by construction, to DRP). To be precise, we estimate the
model





(0.00030) (0.1988) (0.3290) (0.5843)
with standard errors reported in parentheses. The coeﬃcient of determination is
17.8%. We set NDEF = −0.00002 + εNDEF
t . This factor will absorb the time
17We measure TERM as the diﬀerence between the weekly returns on the 20-year Treasury bond
and on the 3-month T-bill. DEF is set equal to the weekly returns on a market portfolio of corporate
bonds with more than 10 years to maturity (Datastream mnemonic MLUCO10(RI)) minus those on
20-year Treasury bonds.
26variation in the corporate bond market factor DEF that cannot be explained by any
linear combination of default-related components.
To further test the hypothesis that DRP is a priced factor, we make use of method
(M2) and implement a variant of the Fama-MacBeth approach to estimating beta-
pricing models on larger sets of test assets. Our sample has 250 weeks, from January
2, 2002 to October 11, 2006. We use the ﬁrst 50 weeks, called the pre-testing period,
to compute the time-series factor loadings for each of the test assets. As suggested
in Fama and MacBeth (1973), we estimate these loadings directly using the formula
cov(Ri(t),F(t))/var(F(t)), where Ri(t) and F(t) denote returns on test asset i and
on some factor, respectively, rather than running (15) for the ﬁrst 50 weeks of our
sample.18 Fama and MacBeth (1973) ﬁrst compute the factor loadings for every stock
and then, in a second step, use the estimated loadings to form equity portfolios. A
number of reasons prevent us from performing a similar construction of new portfolios
that are sorted on betas. On the one hand, our test assets are actual portfolios,
meaning we do not necessarily have to form portfolios again. More importantly, even
if we wanted to re-sort our portfolios that were grouped prior to any estimation,
this would not be possible for the corporate bond portfolios since weekly (or, more
generally, regularly spaced) pricing data is not available at the individual issue level.
Using portfolios that were formed before any estimation of factor loadings is performed
diﬀers from the typical econometric approach. Going forward, the asset pricing test
results for (M2) should be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
After computing the time-series factor loadings for the ﬁrst 50 weeks, we compute
the returns of our test asset portfolios for the following 50 weeks. We call this later
50-week period the testing period. The cross-sectional regressions are run in this
period, using the implementation described next. For each of the ﬁrst 10 weeks of
the testing period, we run cross-sectional regressions of the test assets returns on the
time-series factor loadings computed in the 50-week pre-testing period. Speciﬁcally,
for every week t, we run
Ri(t) − RF(t) = γ0(t) + γMKT(t)βi
MKT(t − l) + γSMB(t)βi
SMB(t − l)
+γHML(t)βi
HML(t − l) + γUMD(t)βi
UMD(t − l)
+γTERM(t)βi
TERM(t − l) + γNDEF(t)βi
NDEF(t − l)
+γDRP(t)βi
DRP(t − l) + ￿i(t), (16)
where t−l < t implies that the factor loadings are computed l-weeks ago, 1 ≤ l < 10.
18The latter might yield diﬀerent results because factors are not necessarily orthogonal during the
ﬁrst 50 weeks of our sample.
27For each of the following 10 weeks of the testing period, we again run cross-
sectional regressions as in (16), the only diﬀerence being that the time-series factor
loadings are re-computed to incorporate additionally the ﬁrst 10 weeks of the testing
period. In other words, the factor loadings are now computed on the sample con-
taining the 50-week pre-testing period plus the ﬁrst 10 weeks of the testing period.
As we advance to the next 10 weeks of the testing period, the factor loadings are
re-computed again, and the cross-sectional tests are implemented just as before. This
testing procedure continues until we reach the end of the 50-week testing period. At
this point, we replace the initial 50-week pre-testing period with the 50-week testing
period, and implement the cross-sectional tests just as before. We continue with this
procedure until we reach the end of our 250-week sample. To indicate that the factor
loadings βi
· are updated every 10-week period, they now carry a time label (t − l) in
speciﬁcation (16).
Inferences about whether the DRP factor is priced will be based on the ﬁrst
and second moments of the series γDRP(t), adjusted for heteroscedasticity. We im-
plement (16) for a number of sets of test assets. The ﬁrst three sets each contain
portfolios from only a single market. To be precise, we form one set of test assets
that includes all 52 corporate bond portfolios, a second set that includes the 149 eq-
uity portfolios considered in this study, and a third set comprised of the 16 index put
option portfolios described in Section 2.3. We also perform cross-sectional tests using
sets of test assets that span across multiple markets. In particular, we investigate the
set of test assets that includes all corporate bond and equity portfolios, and the set
that encompasses all available test assets from all three markets. We now present our
asset pricing test results.
5.1 Corporate Bonds
We start by investigating whether the DRP factor is priced in the corporate bond
market. Our test assets consist of corporate bond portfolios sorted on characteristics
such as credit quality (IG and HY Bloomberg-NASD portfolios, 7 ML portfolios
sorted on S&P ratings), time to maturity (6 ML portfolios) and industry (30 HY and
4 IG ML portfolios). Details on the construction of these portfolios were provided in
Section 2.3.
Table 5 in Appendix C summarizes the results of time-series regressions related
to (15) for the investment-grade and the high-yield Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond
portfolios. The table consists of two parts. The ﬁrst panel shows the estimation
28results for the case where the explanatory variables include only factors that are
known in the existing literature to capture common variation in equity, treasury
or corporate bond markets, and are likely to account for macroeconomic risk. To be
precise, we estimate (15) after replacing the last two covariates, NDEF and DRP, by
the Fama and French (1993) corporate bond market factor DEF. The latter captures
an important part of the common time-series variation in the returns on the corporate
bond portfolios that were considered in the aforementioned study. We conﬁrm that
the same holds true with regard to the Bloomberg-NASD portfolios. We ﬁnd that
the three stock-market factors, momentum and the treasury-market factor combine
to explain 43.3% and 69.2% of the time variation in HY and IG portfolio returns,
respectively.19 Adding the DEF factor as a covariate increases these coeﬃcients
of determination to 62.3% and 81.6%. The results in Table 5 show that the DEF
factor loads positively and signiﬁcantly on both Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond
portfolios, and that the estimated slope coeﬃcient is higher for high-yield bonds, and
lower for investment-grade debt.
The second panel in Table 5 shows the results of estimating the model (15) as
stated, for both the HY and the IG Bloomberg-NASD portfolios. Using the ﬁrst panel
of results as a benchmark, this allows us to understand whether the explanatory power
of the corporate bond market factor stems from a default-risk-premia component
(DRP), a non-default-related component (NDEF), or both. In the latter scenario,
replacing DEF by DRP and NDEF should also yield a sizeable increase in the
regression R2’s.20
We ﬁnd that both portfolios load signiﬁcantly on our DRP factor. The slope
coeﬃcient for the HY portfolio is estimated to be more than twice the size of that for
the IG portfolio. This diﬀerence in exposures to the default risk premia factor helps to
explain, at least to some extent, the large diﬀerence in average returns for the HY and
the IG portfolios. The former earns an average weekly excess return of 24 basis points
during our sample period, while the latter earns about 5 basis points. Interestingly,
for the non-default-related component of DEF the ﬁndings are somewhat diﬀerent:
the estimated slope coeﬃcients for NDEF are comparable for high-credit-quality
bonds and high-yield debt. Both are statistically signiﬁcant. As a result, we ﬁnd that
replacing the DEF factor by DRP and NDEF makes a substantial contribution
towards explaining the time-variation in the Bloomberg-NASD portfolios, even after
19These results are not reported in Table 5.
20Recall from (13) and (16) that DRP and NDEF are orthogonal for our sample period. However,
they do not have to add up to DEF.
29controlling for known systematic factors. The R2 increases from 62.3% to 70.2% and
from 81.6% to 87.8% for the HY and IG portfolio, respectively. This suggests that
bonds are exposed to both the default-risk-premia component and the non-default-
related component (likely due to illiquidity risk) of corporate bond returns, although
it seems that the latter is relatively more important for IG debt.
Lastly we ﬁnd that replacing the DEF factor by a default-risk-premia and a non-
default-related component makes a signiﬁcant contribution to reducing the pricing
errors of the HY portfolio, lowering them from 6 to 1 basis points per week. Pricing
errors are not statistically diﬀerent from zero, except for the IG portfolio where the
size of the error is not trivial relative to the weekly average excess return of about 5
basis points.
The evidence in Table 5 supports the hypothesis that the DRP factor is priced
by the Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond portfolios. We now investigate whether
this applies more generally to the corporate bond market. Table 6 in Appendix C
reports the results of the time-series regression in (15) for 7 Merrill Lynch corporate
bond portfolios sorted on S&P credit ratings. We ﬁnd that the DRP factor loading
is estimated to be substantially higher for portfolios below investment-grade status
than for portfolios of good and medium credit quality. Given that average returns are
higher for high-credit-quality bonds and lower for speculative-grade debt, the cross-
sectional relation between the slope coeﬃcient on the DRP factor and the average
returns on the rating portfolios is quite striking, both economically and statistically.
It suggests that risk exposure to the DRP factor can partially explain the average
returns earned by these portfolios, supporting the price behavior already documented
in Table 5. The pricing errors of all portfolios are relatively small compared to the
corresponding average excess returns, and they are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Next, we perform similar time-series regressions for 6 ML corporate bond portfolios
sorted on time to maturity. The results are reported in Table 7. Note that average
portfolio returns increase monotonically with time to maturity. From a rational-
asset-pricing-model point of view this pattern makes perfect sense because longer
maturities in bonds are typically associated with a larger exposure to inﬂation risk.
Irrespective of the actual sources of risk impacting these portfolios, if higher average
returns represent compensation for bearing more risk, then our goal is to understand
whether part of this risk exposure can be attributed to the DRP factor. The DRP
coeﬃcient estimates in Table 7 conﬁrm that portfolios with longer maturities tend to
be also more exposed to the DRP factor. In addition, all of the pricing errors are
small relative to the corresponding average returns, and none are statistically diﬀerent
30from zero. The evidence from the maturity portfolios adds to that in Tables 5 and 6
in supporting the hypothesis that the DRP factor is priced in the corporate bond
market.
Further evidence is provided in Table 8, where the test assets consist of 30 high-
yield and 4 investment-grade ML corporate bond portfolios sorted by sector and
broad industry, respectively. Again, both the median high-yield and investment-grade
portfolios load signiﬁcantly on the DRP factor. The median of the average weekly
portfolios excess returns earned by HY portfolios is 14 basis points compared to 6
basis points for IG portfolios. This diﬀerence in returns can be partially explained
by the fact that the estimated median loading for the HY portfolios is more than
twice the size of that for the IG portfolios. The median pricing errors for both classes
of portfolios are again relatively small in comparison to the corresponding median
average returns, and not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
We conclude this section by implementing the Fama-MacBeth two-pass procedure
described as method (M2). The results, shown in Table 11, present more in-depth
evidence in support of the hypothesis that the DRP factor is priced in the corporate
bond market. The ﬁrst panel reports the results when the set of test assets consists
of the two Bloomberg-NASD portfolios and all 47 Merrill Lynch corporate bond
portfolios. We ﬁnd that the DRP beta alone explains about 13.5% of the cross-section
of returns. Adding in the market beta increases the coeﬃcient of determination to
30.3%. In both scenarios, the estimates for the risk premia on the DRP factor, as
extracted from this set of test assets, are positive (although not statistically signiﬁcant
for the latter case).21 For both models presented in the ﬁrst panel of Table 11, the
intercept is statistically insigniﬁcant, which is as expected if the underlying asset
pricing model is correct.
The second part of Table 12 uses a richer set of test assets, including equity
and equity options portfolios. We will postpone a discussion of these results until
Section 5.4.
5.2 Equity
We now turn our focus to the equity market. The ﬁrst panel in Table 9 presents the
results of the time-series regression (15) for the Fama-French 100 equity portfolios
sorted on size and book-to-market equity. Consistent with the results in Fama and
21Given the 52 test assets, we do not have enough power to estimate the model in (16) as stated
(that is, with all 7 explanatory variables).
31French (1993), we ﬁnd that the three Fama-French stock-market factors enter with
positive coeﬃcient estimates, accompanied by high Newey-West t-statistics (especially
for MKT and SMB). The slope coeﬃcients for both the treasury and the corporate
bond market factors are estimated to be positive. They contribute little, however,
towards explaining the time variation of these equity portfolios, which is also in line
with the aforementioned study.
In contrast to what was observed for corporate bond portfolios, replacing the
DEF factor by DRP and NDEF does not improve matters. The second panel in
Table 9 shows that neither slope coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant for the median
equity portfolio. (The former even enters (15) with the wrong sign.) We also ex-
perimented with the 49 Fama-French industry portfolios as well as the Fama-French
decile portfolios sorted on book-to-market equity, with similar results.
5.3 Options
Next we test whether our DRP factor is priced in the equity options market. Coval
and Shumway (2001) show that something besides market risk is important for pricing
the risk associated with option contracts. The authors oﬀer some evidence that
systematic stochastic volatility may be an important factor in explaining the time-
series variation in option portfolio returns. Jones (2006) argues that a third, so-called
“jump” factor accounts for an additional fraction of the option returns, although
even such a three-factor model is insuﬃcient to explain the magnitude of expected
returns, especially the negative average returns for short-term out-of-the-money put
options. The latent jump factor in Jones (2006) is diﬃcult to characterize in terms
of any observable series, although it seems to be associated in some way with large
one-day returns in the stock market which are usually negative. The fact that the
jump factor seems to capture risk associated with rare negative events appears to be
helpful in capturing some of the well-documented skew in the returns on index option
portfolios.
Unexpected default events with market-wide impact (such as Enron’s demise or
the Worldcom scandal) are certainly one form of rare events that will lead to large
losses in the equity market. Recall that the jump-to-default-risk component of our
DRP factor captures the common component in returns on pure default-contingent
claims that is due to the risk of such unexpected defaults. DRP JtD is therefore
an excellent candidate to be informative about the shape of the return distribution
of index options. Compared to Jones’ jump factor, it has the advantage that it is
32intuitive and that it can be measured in a straightforward fashion from credit market
data.
According to Figure 6, DRP and DRP JtD are closely linked. It is thus reasonable
to examine whether the DRP factor contributes towards explaining the cross-sectional
variation in the returns on our put option test portfolios.22 We conduct asset pricing
tests in the spirit of method (M1), using as test assets the 16 portfolios sorted on
time to maturity and moneyness that were introduced in Section 2.3. To account for
systematic volatility risk premia, we include weekly changes in the logarithm of the
stock-market volatility index V IX as an additional covariate in (15).
The results are reported in Table 10. Note that the loadings on the V IX factor line
up almost perfectly with the average returns on the portfolios. The price impact of
market-wide volatility risk on equity options is well documented in the literature, and
our results are consistent with previous ﬁndings. With regard to the DRP factor, we
discover that both average returns and the estimated slope coeﬃcients for short- and
medium-term index put options exhibit an increasing trend in magnitude (decreasing
in absolute value) as they move closer to the money. In other words, portfolios
that are further away from the money generally have more negative returns and also
load more negatively on DRP. Even though we observe the anticipated directional
relationship between average returns and beta estimates, the slope coeﬃcients for
DRP are not statistically signiﬁcant during our sample period. For each moneyness
bin, both average returns and the beta estimates for our DRP factor increase with
increasing time to maturity.
5.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions
Finally, we implement the Fama-MacBeth two-pass procedure using test assets from
all three markets, that is, from the corporate bond, equity and option markets. The
second panel in Table 12 shows the results, which are based on a total number of 214
test assets. In particular, we include the IG and HY Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond
portfolios, all 47 Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios described in Section 2.3,
the 100 Fama and French equity portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market, the 49
Fama and French industry equity portfolios, and the 16 index put options portfolios
sorted on moneyness and time-to-maturity. We ﬁnd that the DRP beta contributes
to the cross-sectional ﬁt of regression (16), even when it is extracted from test assets
which span not only the corporate bond market but also the equity and the equity
22The results for DRP JtD are described in Section 6.
33option markets. Our results show that the weekly risk premia of the DRP factor is
about 3 basis points, and that this estimate is statistically signiﬁcant.
5.5 Test for Firm Characteristics
We conclude this section with a test based on ﬁrm characteristics. Following Daniel
and Titman (1997), we study the extent to which the common component in ﬁrm-
speciﬁc risk-adjusted excess returns on pure default-contingent claims is due to ﬁrm
characteristics which may behave very similarly, across ﬁrms, over time. To investi-
gate whether the time variation in DRP is solely driven by certain ﬁrm characteristics,
say ϑ(t), we estimate the linear model
R
i
t,h(T) − RFt = α
i + β
i
MKT MKT(t) + β
i





UMD UMD(t) + β
i





DRP DRP(t) + β
i
Char ϑ
i(t − h) + ￿
i
ϑ(t).
The dependent variables are the ﬁrm-speciﬁc excess returns on pure default-contingent
claims of ﬁrm i with a maturity of one year, as deﬁned in (3) in Section 3. On the
right-hand side, we have the usual factors, including DRP and NDEF, plus a time-
varying ﬁrm characteristic. Should ϑi(t−h) explain a signiﬁcant portion of the time
variation in Ri
t,h(T)−RFt, then DRP will depend on the time-varying characteristic
according to (11) and (12). In that case, the common variation in risk-adjusted excess
returns on pure default-contingent claims could be due to ﬁrm characteristics moving
together.
Results are reported in Table 13 in Appendix C, where we consider four diﬀerent
ﬁrm characteristics including the ﬁrm’s 1-year EDF rate, recovery rate, 30-day implied
call volatility, and leverage ratio. We ﬁnd that the common variation in risk-adjusted
excess returns on pure default-contingent claims is very unlikely to be due to one of
these characteristics. Moreover, for each of the tests, the estimated loading on the
DRP factor is always highly signiﬁcant, both economically and statistically.
6 A Closer Look at the DRP Components
In the previous section, we showed that the DRP factor is priced in corporate bond
markets and that for index put options the time-series loadings on the default risk
premia factor align with the average returns along the time-to-maturity dimension,
34for each moneyness bin. According to (13), the DRP factor can be decomposed
into three components. These are the portions associated with common changes in
expected default losses (DRP L), common changes in jump-to-default risk premia
(DRP JtD) and common variation in market prices of default risk (DRP MPR). It is
natural to ask to what extent each of these three components contribute to explaining
the time variation and the cross-section of asset returns.
To answer this, we reproduce the results in Tables 5 through 12, after replacing the
DRP factor in (15) and (16) by each of DRP L, DRP JtD and DRP MPR. The results
for corporate bonds are summarized in columns 2 to 4 of Table 14 in Appendix D. We
only report the loading estimates for the default-related factor. For corporate bonds,
the loadings on both DRP JtD and DRP MPR are statistically signiﬁcant and line up
nicely with average excess returns. For the market-price-of-default-risk component,
this is not surprising since given our model speciﬁcations it captures much of the
same variation as DRP itself (see Footnote 16). The results for DRP JtD indicate
that corporate bonds with higher loadings on the jump-to-default risk component have
higher average returns, implying that jump to default risk is priced in the corporate
bond market in the sense of method (M1). For the equity portfolios, none of the
factors by themselves appear to be signiﬁcant in explaining the time variation of
returns. The results for the index put options are more interesting. The DRP JtD
factor is estimated consistently to have the right (negative) sign. For each moneyness
bin, the beta loading estimates line up with the average excess returns. They are
estimated to be lower (more negative) for out-of-money options than for at the money
contracts. Also, the loadings for on DRP L line up along the moneyness direction for
the short-term put options. The negative coeﬃcient estimate for the deepest OTM
puts is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, showing that common changes in expected default
losses are useful in predicting returns for deep-OTM put options. The results for the
MPR component are again similar to those for DRP itself, except that the levels
of statistical signiﬁcance are higher and that the loadings have the correct sign also
for the long-term options. With regard to the cross-sectional results, Table 16 shows
that the risk premia on DRP L, DRP JtD and DRP MPR are 1, 2 and 1 basis points,
respectively. The latter two are signiﬁcant at the 5%-level. It is of interest to note
that for the index put options, most of the risk premia is associated with the jump-
to-default component of DRP.
Next, we investigate the scenario where we replace DRP by its components,
DRP L and DRP −L in (14). The results are summarized in the last two columns
of Tables 14 and 16, and the second panel of Table 15. We ﬁnd that the explanatory
35power of DRP for returns on corporate debt and on index put options mainly stems
from the portion DRP −L of the default risk factor that is not explained by changes
in expected default losses. The estimated risk premia on DRP −L amounts to 3 ba-
sis points per week, after controlling for all other known systematic risk factors. In
the next section, we develop a theoretical framework for a pricing kernel that is in
line with our empirical ﬁnding that DRP −L is priced for assets with a non-degenerate
payoﬀ structure in the default states (such as corporate bonds and index put options).
7 A Model Framework Explaining Our Results
In this section, we propose a theoretical framework for a pricing kernel, M, that is
consistent with our empirical ﬁndings. We consider an economy with N ﬁrms in
which the fundamentals are captured by a d-dimensional vector of state variables, X.
The dynamics of X are speciﬁed as
dXt = µ(Xt,t)dt + Σ(Xt,t)dWt,
where µ(·,t) is a d-dimensional column vector of drifts and Σ(·,t) denotes the d × d
matrix of state-dependent instantaneous volatilities. Wt is a d-dimensional stan-
dard Brownian motion on some probability space (Ω,P), with informational ﬁltra-
tion {Ft}t≥0 generated by this process. The innovations in Wt describe the diﬀusive
systematic risk in our economy.
We extend the doubly-stochastic framework of corporate default in Section 3 by
assuming that default of ﬁrm i is triggered either by a market-wide credit event ¯ τ0 that
aﬀects all ﬁrms in the economy or by a default event ¯ τi that is speciﬁc to ﬁrm i or the
sector it belongs to. In other words, we set τi = min{¯ τ0, ¯ τi}. For each i = 0,...,N,
¯ τi is the ﬁrst event time of a (non-explosive) counting processes ¯ Ni with intensity
process ¯ λP,i, relative to (Ω,F,P). Let us assume that the state process X determines
actual default intensities according to ¯ λ
P,i
t = ¯ λP,i(Xt), for all i. For doubly-stochastic
models, conditional on X, the various event times are independent Poisson arrivals at
time-varying deterministic intensities ¯ λP,i(Xt). We rule out simultaneous event times
and assume P(¯ τi = ¯ τj) = 0 for i 6= j, which implies that the actual default intensity
λP,i for ﬁrm i introduced in Section 3 can be interpreted as λP,i = ¯ λP,0 + ¯ λP,i.
36Suppose that the pricing kernel M for this economy can be written as
dMt
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where rt = r(Xt) is the instantaneous risk-free interest rate, Λt = Λ(Xt) denotes the
market price of diﬀusive risk, ¯ Γ0
t = ¯ Γ0(Xt) is the market price of default risk associated
with the market-wide credit event time ¯ τ0, and ¯ Γi
t = ¯ Γi(Xt) is the market price of
default risk associated with the credit event for ﬁrm i. Risk-neutral event arrival
intensities are given by ¯ λQ,i = (1 − ¯ Γi)¯ λP,i. Equation (17) extends the formulation
in Dai and Singleton (2003) to a multi-ﬁrm setting.
Deﬁne ¯ λP
t = ¯ λ
P,1
t + ... + ¯ λ
P,N








































































The pricing kernel in (18) can therefore be conveniently expressed as

















































Note that Et is equal to the pricing kernel that would have applied in the absence of
any risk premia associated with default events (that is, for ¯ Γi = 0 for all i).
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ds. Hence, the diﬀerence between the excess




















This suggests that the portion of the excess returns on pure default-contingent claims
that is due to common changes in jump to default risk premia DRP JtD is to a large
extent driven by the market price of jump-to-default risk associated with the market-
wide default event ¯ τ0. In what follows we investigate the eﬀect of this market-wide
source for jump-to-default risk on the expected returns of a ﬁrm’s equity and debt
claims. Note that for h small, as is the case in our application, RQP,i and RQQ,i are
closely related, which suggests that much of the time variation in DRP −L also stems
from the jump-to-default risk premia associated with ¯ τ0.
Let ˜ R
E,i
t+h and ˜ R
D,i
t+h denote the gross return over the period [t,t + h] on equity
and debt of ﬁrm i, respectively. If both equity and corporate bond markets are










for · = E,D. As long as ﬁrm i is solvent, the gross return on equity claims is non-zero.
We will assume a zero-recovery value to equity holders in the event of default, which
implies ˜ R
E,i
t+h = ˜ R
E,i
t+h1{τi>t+h}. With this in mind, we have
Et ˜ R
E,i









































where ˜ RF t+h is the gross return on risk-less bonds given by







































To gain intuition as to why the DRP factor does not seem to make a signiﬁcant
38contribution to explaining expected returns on equity, let us study (21) after turning
oﬀ all diﬀusive risk premia in the economy by setting Λ = 0. In this simpliﬁed































s ds. The covariance term in (22)
is close to zero as long as rs and {¯ Γj
s¯ λP,j
s }j are relatively stable over the short interval
[t,t + h].23 At the same time, the last term in (21) is small for realistic values of
default intensities for ﬁrm i. In summary, little or no dependency between expected
returns and either DRP JtD or DRP −DRP L will be detected. A similar observation
holds true for DRP by extension.
The fact that corporate bonds have non-zero payoﬀs in the event of default sub-
stantially changes the relation between corporate bond returns and jump-to-default
risk premia. According to (21), the gross returns on corporate bonds of ﬁrm i, ˜ R
D,i
t+h,
can be written as
Et ˜ R
D,i



















Even though the ﬁrst covariance term might be negligible as it is for equity, the second
covariance term captures the dependency between realized returns and DRP JtD (or,
similarly, DRP −L). These results provide intuition as to why for an economy with a
unique pricing kernel for valuing both corporate bonds and equity, corporate bonds
returns but not equity returns load on the jump-to-default component of DRP, and
hence, by extension, on DRP.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
This is the ﬁrst paper to extract a common risk factor from credit markets and
investigate its contribution towards explaining average returns observed in corporate
bond, equity and index option markets. Our default risk premia factor, or simply
DRP factor, is identiﬁed as that portion of the weekly excess returns on an equally-
weighted portfolio of pure default-contingent claims that cannot be explained by linear
combinations of systematic stock-market and Treasury-market risk factors. Asset
23Recall that conditional on default intensities, the realized return on ﬁrm i’s equity is independent
from the credit event times of the other ﬁrms in the economy.
39pricing tests using returns on Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond indices suggest that
the DRP factor is priced in the corporate bond market. A cross-sectional analysis
of 47 Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted on either industry, maturity or
rating supports these ﬁndings. We decompose the DRP factor to show that most of
its time variation can be explained by the portion DRP JtD that is due to common
variation in jump-to-default risk premia. Using 16 portfolios of delta-hedged put
options written on the S&P 500 index and sorted on maturity and moneyness, we
ﬁnd that both average returns and the beta estimates for our DRP factor become
more negative with decreasing time to maturity. There is little to no evidence of
the DRP factor being priced in equity markets. We develop a theoretical framework
where DRP JtD is part of the pricing kernel that supports our empirical ﬁndings. It
shows that DRP JtD captures the jump-to-default risk premia associated with market-
wide credit events.
As a ﬁnal remark we want to address the issue that from a practical perspective,
trading strategies based on the DRP factor are diﬃcult to implement because the pure
default-contingent claims used to construct the portfolios are not actually traded. To
give the reader a sense of how a trading strategy based on the same motivation as for
our default risk premia DRP factor can be implemented, we compute an alternative















t denotes the at-market 5-year default swap rate for ﬁrm i at time t.
For the median ﬁrm in our sample, CDRP explains 20.5% of the risk-adjusted excess
returns on default swaps. Note that since each of our CDS observations is considered a
new constant-maturity par-coupon credit spread, R
CDS,i
t,h is no longer a holding period
return.24 Conversations with market participants, however, indicate that for h equal
to a week, the eﬀect of diﬀerent maturity dates associated with CDSi
t and CDSi
t−h
is minimal, and is certainly outweighed by the advantages of having a tradable form
of the default risk premia factor available.
The asset pricing test results for CDRP are summarized in Appendix E, showing
the estimated loadings for the default-related factors only. For the corporate bond
24This is diﬀerent from the contracts underlying a particular series of the Dow Jones CDX indices,
which have a ﬁxed maturity date around either June 20 or December 20 of each year. Data on the
HY DJ CDX index is available to us only starting April 2005. In addition, our Moody’s KMV EDF
data does not completely overlap with the members of the IG or HY index, which would prohibit
us from decomposing the CDRP factor.
40market, Table 17 indicates that CDRP is priced, and that its explanatory power for
returns stems from the portion unexplained by expected losses, in particular the jump-
to-default risk component. For equity portfolios, the time-series loadings on CDRP
or its components are again not signiﬁcant. In the case of index put options, for each
moneyness bin, the overall trend in the estimated loadings on CDRP is still consistent
(although not longer strictly monotone) with that observed for average returns along
the time-to-maturity dimension. Interestingly, we now ﬁnd that for each time-to-
maturity bin, the negative factor loadings decrease as the options mover further away
from the money, as do average excess returns. (Two exceptions are the third and
the ﬁrst moneyness bin for the ﬁrst and the second-to-expire options, respectively.)
For many option portfolios, the loadings are now statistically signiﬁcant, especially
for longer dated options. Again, similar observations hold true when replacing the
CDS-based default risk premia factor by the portion that is associated with jump-
to-default risk premia, conﬁrming our ﬁndings that most of the explanatory power
of CDRP is due to CDRP JtD. Finally, we ﬁnd that the CDRP factor commands a
risk premium of 48 basis points per week. Note that this ﬁgure is much larger than
for DRP due to the fact that CDRP captures returns on par-coupon spreads in the
sense of (23).
41A Data Coverage
ﬁrm rtg 5yr CDS 1yr CDS recov no EDF no 5yr CDS no 1yr CDS
Basic Materials
Bowater Ba 289 177 0.41 248 250 250
Cytec Industries Baa 60 25 0.40 248 231 193
Dow Chemical A 63 45 0.40 248 250 249
Eastman Chemical Baa 70 39 0.41 248 250 244
International Paper Baa 71 45 0.40 248 250 250
Monsanto Baa 52 23 0.41 248 233 194
PPG Industries A 34 19 0.41 248 250 250
Praxair A 26 13 0.41 248 250 243
Rohm and Haas A 33 15 0.41 248 250 250
Consumer Goods
ArvinMeritor Ba 317 212 0.39 248 250 249
Black & Decker Baa 42 21 0.41 248 250 249
BorgWarner Baa 53 27 0.40 248 250 249
Campbell Soup A 29 14 0.40 248 250 249
Coca-Cola Enterprises A 29 13 0.40 248 250 250
ConAgra Foods Baa 46 23 0.39 248 250 250
Dana Ba 449 421 0.41 248 220 220
Delphi Baa 308 343 0.41 195 200 200
Eastman Kodak Baa 172 86 0.39 248 250 250
Ford Motor Baa 440 284 0.41 248 250 250
General Motors Baa 456 334 0.41 248 250 250
Georgia-Paciﬁc Ba 319 265 0.41 206 250 250
Sara Lee A 36 14 0.40 248 250 246
Tyson Foods Baa 100 59 0.41 248 250 249
Visteon Ba 415 317 0.42 248 250 250
Consumer Services
Cardinal Health A 48 21 0.41 248 248 242
Clear Channel Comm Baa 130 99 0.40 248 250 250
Comcast Baa 129 104 0.40 244 250 248
Interpublic Group of Cos Baa 259 192 0.40 248 249 247
Omnicom Group Baa 71 66 0.40 248 250 249
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ba 312 305 0.40 248 250 250
Sabre Holdings Baa 89 50 0.40 248 231 230
Time Warner Cos Baa 122 103 0.39 248 250 250
Walt Disney Baa 57 37 0.40 248 250 250
Health Care
Baxter International Baa 40 26 0.40 248 250 250
Boston Scientiﬁc Baa 43 21 0.41 248 250 240
Bristol-Myers Squibb A 30 17 0.41 248 237 234
Chiron Baa 43 34 0.40 223 225 222
Genzyme WR 48 19 0.39 241 156 148
HCA (Oldco) Ba 174 102 0.41 248 250 246
Health Management Assoc Baa 67 29 0.39 248 181 149
Humana Baa 70 44 0.41 248 247 234
Lab of America Holdgs Baa 47 11 0.40 248 177 108
Merck & Co. Aaa 18 6 0.41 248 227 183
Quest Diagnostics Baa 47 14 0.40 248 187 139
Schering-Plough Baa 35 16 0.41 248 229 187
Universal Health Services Baa 72 31 0.39 248 166 146
Wyeth Baa 51 34 0.40 248 250 247
Industrials
Boeing A 40 25 0.40 248 250 250
Caterpillar A 30 16 0.40 248 250 250
Cummins Ba 204 165 0.40 248 250 250
Danaher A 30 23 0.40 248 250 245
Deere A 37 23 0.40 248 250 250
Eaton A 31 17 0.40 248 250 247
Goodrich Baa 98 72 0.40 248 250 250
Honeywell International A 37 23 0.40 248 250 250
Lockheed Martin Baa 43 24 0.41 248 250 250
MeadWestvaco Baa 72 39 0.39 248 244 240
Northrop Grumman Baa 54 34 0.41 248 250 246
Raytheon Baa 75 54 0.39 248 250 249
Sealed Air Baa 164 144 0.38 248 250 240
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ﬁrm rtg CDS5 CDS1 recov no EDF no CDS5 no CDS1
Sherwin-Williams A 41 20 0.41 248 250 247
Temple-Inland Baa 100 64 0.40 248 250 235
United Technologies A 23 12 0.40 248 247 238
Waste Management Baa 96 74 0.41 248 248 235
Oil and Gas
Anadarko Petroleum Baa 42 21 0.40 248 250 249
Baker Hughes A 26 15 0.41 248 250 249
Devon Energy Baa 63 48 0.40 248 250 250
Diamond Oﬀshore Drilling Baa 43 25 0.40 248 250 248
El Paso Caa 547 524 0.37 248 250 250
Halliburton Baa 147 130 0.41 248 247 246
Kerr-McGee Baa 79 41 0.41 239 249 235
Kinder Morgan Energy P Baa 56 29 0.41 230 250 231
Kinder Morgan Baa 71 36 0.40 248 242 215
Marathon Oil Baa 44 24 0.41 248 239 235
Nabors Industries A 42 25 0.40 248 250 244
National Oilwell Varco Baa 49 21 0.39 248 203 157
Pioneer Natural Resources Ba 87 33 0.40 248 156 124
Pride International Ba 191 116 0.40 248 205 184
Transocean Baa 54 41 0.40 248 250 250
Valero Energy Baa 85 61 0.40 248 250 246
Weatherford International Baa 34 14 0.40 248 166 150
Technology
Computer Sciences A 60 29 0.39 248 249 244
Electronic Data Systems Baa 160 120 0.40 248 250 248
Hewlett-Packard A 47 31 0.39 248 250 250
IBM A 32 18 0.40 248 250 250
Lucent Technologies B 684 594 0.38 248 250 250
Pitney Bowes Aa 22 12 0.41 248 250 240
Sun Microsystems Baa 126 89 0.40 248 250 249
Xerox Ba 409 393 0.38 248 250 249
Telecommunications
ALLTEL A 58 26 0.41 248 212 196
AT&T A 167 132 0.38 248 250 250
BellSouth A 45 27 0.41 248 250 249
CenturyTel Baa 98 56 0.41 248 250 237
Citizens Comm Baa 237 156 0.39 248 250 245
New Cingular Wireless Servs Baa 261 262 0.38 145 147 147
Nextel Comm B 511 413 0.37 187 189 167
Sprint Nextel Baa 210 211 0.38 248 250 250
Verizon Comm A 73 63 0.42 248 250 243
Utilities
American Electric Power Baa 105 86 0.40 248 250 249
Cinergy Baa 68 56 0.41 220 250 247
Constellation Energy Group Baa 80 55 0.41 248 250 239
Dominion Resources Baa 62 42 0.41 248 250 248
Duke Energy NaN 62 48 0.40 248 250 249
Exelon Baa 56 32 0.40 248 246 229
FirstEnergy Baa 106 74 0.40 248 226 213
ONEOK Baa 59 39 0.40 248 250 240
Progress Energy Baa 67 46 0.39 248 250 236
Sempra Energy Baa 73 46 0.40 248 250 226
TECO Energy Ba 228 199 0.41 248 230 221
TXU Ba 186 168 0.39 248 250 249
Williams Cos B 476 542 0.37 248 250 250
Xcel Energy Baa 146 140 0.39 248 239 225
Table 1: Firm Summary Statistics: For each ﬁrm, we report the number of
weekly observations of EDF rates, 5- and 1-year CDS rates, the average 5-year
CDS rate, the average 1-year CDS rate, and the average recovery rate. The
sample period is January 2, 2002 through October 11, 2006.
43Moneyness Bin Maturity Bin
1st 2nd 3rd-5th ≥ 6th
Moneyness
0.85-0.9 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
0.9-0.95 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
0.95-1 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97
> 1 1.07 1.07 1.10 1.13
Maturity (days)
0.85-0.9 25 47 100 439
0.9-0.95 24 45 97 415
0.95-1 22 44 90 373
> 1 23 45 98 349
Number of Valid Return Observations
0.85-0.9 144 530 980 2509
0.9-0.95 487 1179 1174 2556
0.95-1 1185 1762 1555 2388
> 1 1086 1796 2173 4609
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the S&P 500 Index Put Option Portfolios: The ﬁrst
part of the table shows the value-weighted averages of the moneyness for the options in each bin,
whereas the second part lists the value-weighted averages of the days until to expiration. The last
portion of the table counts the Number of Valid Return Observations for each bin across the time
period January 2002 to April 2006. Source: OptionMetrics.






























Figure 7: Time series of median recovery rates by sector. Source: Markit.
44B Time Series Estimation of Default Intensities
sector ˆ κ ˆ σ ˆ ρ avg ˆ θi log-like no ﬁrms
Basic Materials 0.256 1.041 0.223 2.009 -1.530 9
Consumer Goods 1.196 1.574 0.206 2.993 -2.565 15
Consumer Services 0.236 0.964 0.294 3.147 -2.535 9
Health Care 0.241 1.034 0.172 2.238 -1.774 14
Industrials 0.379 1.067 0.181 2.203 -1.684 17
Oil and Gas 0.109 1.055 0.234 2.584 -2.197 17
Technology 0.667 1.214 0.282 3.621 -3.148 8
Telecommunications 0.225 0.963 0.320 2.949 -2.251 9
Utilities 0.453 1.201 0.335 3.070 -2.628 14
Table 3: Sector-by-sector EDF-implied ML parameter estimates in (6), using weekly
Moody’s KMV 1-year EDFs from January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006. The intensities
λP,i are measured in basis points per year.
sector ˆ κQP ˆ σQ ˆ ρQ avg ˆ θQP ˆ κQQ avg ˆ θQQ log-like
Basic Materials 1.018 1.409 0.298 3.350 0.361 3.567 -2.705
Consumer Goods 0.549 1.255 0.262 4.367 0.250 4.421 -3.585
Consumer Services 0.521 1.836 0.323 3.294 0.393 3.560 -3.332
Health Care 0.963 1.477 0.082 3.294 0.302 2.867 -2.765
Industrials 0.832 1.462 0.207 3.036 0.387 3.489 -2.627
Oil and Gas 0.725 1.306 0.245 3.542 0.339 3.850 -2.827
Technology 0.718 1.692 0.241 3.568 0.315 3.364 -3.414
Telecommunications 0.119 1.576 0.355 3.583 0.276 3.820 -3.489
Utilities 0.681 1.617 0.264 3.101 0.366 3.832 -3.162
Table 4: Sector-by-sector CDS-implied ML parameter estimates in (8), using 1- and 5-year
CDS rates with modiﬁed restructuring and ﬁrm-speciﬁc recovery rates from January 2, 2002
to November 11, 2006. The intensities λQ,i are measured in basis points per year.
C Asset Pricing Test Results
45α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD βTERM βDEF βNDEF βDRP R2 E[R] − RF
Investment-Grade
-0.0002 0.0240 0.0080 0.0399 -0.0306 0.4339 0.6961 – – 0.8159 0.0005
(-1.2655) (1.8139) (0.3862) (1.4946) (-2.1865) (21.6115) (7.6490)
High-Yield
0.0006 0.1190 0.1814 0.2060 -0.0965 0.3302 1.6059 – – 0.6230 0.0024
(1.3935) (4.2902) (3.4764) (3.1014) (-2.9022) (6.2063) (9.6549)
Investment-Grade
-0.0004 0.0371 0.0211 0.0628 -0.0353 0.4025 – 0.4622 0.9947 0.8765 0.0005
(-3.0205) (3.3388) (1.0602) (2.8249) (-2.5370) (24.7091) (5.7547) (13.3886)
High-Yield
0.0001 0.1916 0.2410 0.3345 -0.1470 0.1877 – 0.4897 2.4944 0.7021 0.0024
(0.3208) (7.7639) (4.7794) (4.9990) (-4.7951) (3.3164) (2.1585) (8.5218)
Table 5: The Bloomberg-NASD IG and HY Corporate Bond Portfolios This table reports the results of the time-series
regressions of weekly realized excess returns of portfolios of IG and HY corporate bonds on MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, TERM.
The ﬁrst panel also includes DEF as a covariate. Speciﬁcally, for each portfolio we estimate the regression: R(t) − RF(t) = α +
βMKTMKT(t)+βSMBSMB(t)+βHMLHML(t)+βUMDUMD(t)+βTERMTERM(t)+βDEFDEF(t)+￿(t). The second panel reports
the estimation results after replacing DEF by NDEF and DRP. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags)
are reported in parentheses. The sample period is October 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
4
6Rtg α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD βTERM βNDEF βDRP R2 E[R] − RF
AAA 0.0001 -0.0058 0.0430 0.0138 -0.0115 0.4990 0.0182 0.2180 0.9478 0.0007
(0.7851) (-0.8380) (3.2255) (1.1406) (-1.4936) (44.8414) (0.5801) (4.3125)
AA 0.0000 -0.0041 0.0124 0.0239 -0.0065 0.4476 0.1265 0.2090 0.9323 0.0006
(0.5004) (-0.6135) (1.0264) (1.7380) (-0.7927) (41.6954) (2.3647) (4.4938)
A 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0204 0.0373 -0.0170 0.5299 0.1958 0.2985 0.9562 0.0007
(0.4978) (-0.5268) (1.8189) (2.7331) (-2.3496) (47.2213) (5.8192) (5.8592)
BBB -0.0002 0.0111 0.0256 0.0663 -0.0342 0.5889 0.6924 0.6698 0.9142 0.0007
(-1.8701) (1.2396) (2.1156) (2.7409) (-2.9007) (39.1004) (10.4254) (4.4123)
BB -0.0001 0.0754 0.0451 0.1276 -0.0127 0.2748 0.5564 1.3825 0.4854 0.0009
(-0.3486) (2.5156) (0.5308) (1.9004) (-0.3513) (5.3778) (2.3583) (5.5121)
B 0.0003 0.0900 0.1020 0.1563 -0.0630 0.1754 0.7173 1.5643 0.6326 0.0014
(0.9750) (4.1913) (2.8205) (2.8654) (-2.4780) (5.0943) (5.1561) (7.7088)
C 0.0010 0.0765 0.2932 0.1794 -0.0745 0.1578 0.8871 1.5633 0.4536 0.0023
(1.6140) (1.7075) (4.3527) (2.2191) (-1.5208) (2.5674) (2.7851) (5.3211)
Table 6: The Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Portfolios Sorted by Ratings This table reports the results of the time-series
regressions of weekly realized excess returns of 7 Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted by credit rating on MKT, SMB,
HML, UMD, TERM, and DRP. Speciﬁcally, for each portfolio we estimate the regression: R(t) − RF(t) = α + βMKTMKT(t) +
βSMBSMB(t)+βHMLHML(t)+βUMDUMD(t)+βTERMTERM(t)+βNDEFNDEF(t)+βDRPDRP(t)+￿(t). Newey-West t-statistics
adjusted for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
4
7Maturity α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD βTERM βNDEF βDRP R2 E[R] − RF
1-3 yrs 0.0001 0.0011 0.0207 0.0428 -0.0197 0.1323 0.0742 0.2388 0.5996 0.0003
(0.6133) (0.1762) (2.3659) (3.1078) (-2.5194) (12.8200) (1.6907) (3.7913)
3-5 yrs 0.0000 0.0044 0.0348 0.0689 -0.0321 0.3193 0.0919 0.3645 0.7959 0.0005
(-0.0755) (0.4338) (2.3177) (3.6377) (-2.8668) (19.8836) (1.5915) (4.4815)
5-7 yrs 0.0000 0.0017 0.0349 0.0631 -0.0369 0.4801 0.2300 0.4249 0.8670 0.0007
(0.1187) (0.1560) (2.2771) (2.9231) (-2.8531) (27.6637) (3.0711) (4.7231)
7-10 yrs -0.0001 0.0030 0.0299 0.0642 -0.0350 0.6427 0.4189 0.5057 0.9364 0.0008
(-0.6701) (0.3315) (2.3356) (3.2810) (-3.2604) (45.6782) (7.2170) (5.2430)
10-15 yrs -0.0002 -0.0074 0.0472 0.0801 -0.0411 0.7803 0.3948 0.5312 0.9420 0.0009
(-0.9295) (-0.5390) (2.5067) (3.4099) (-3.5720) (41.9704) (4.2720) (5.7913)
15+ yrs -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0067 -0.0147 0.0080 1.0420 1.1099 0.6118 0.9806 0.0010
(-1.5584) (0.0670) (-0.7228) (-0.7081) (0.7623) (86.9993) (28.7324) (5.0511)
Table 7: The Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Portfolios Sorted by Time to Maturity This table reports the results of
the time-series regressions of weekly realized excess returns of 6 Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted by time to maturity
on MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, and DRP. Speciﬁcally, for each portfolio we estimate the regression: R(t) − RF(t) =
α + βMKTMKT(t) + βSMBSMB(t) + βHMLHML(t) + βUMDUMD(t) + βTERMTERM(t) + βNDEFNDEF(t) + βDRPDRP(t) + ￿(t).
Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002
to October 11, 2006.
4
8α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD βTERM βDEF βNDEF βDRP R2 E[R] − RF
Investment-Grade Broad Industry Portfolios
0.0001 -0.0060 0.0299 0.0336 -0.0115 0.4086 0.1782 – – 0.8747 0.0006
(1.1485) (-0.8321) (2.4406) (1.9285) (-1.4352) (29.8452) (3.8846)
0.0000 0.0003 0.0320 0.0474 -0.0184 0.3978 – 0.0946 0.2874 0.8837 0.0006
(0.2525) (0.0565) (2.6873) (2.6137) (-2.2647) (30.9493) (1.7544) (4.4872)
High-Yield Sector Portfolios
0.0010 0.0329 0.1010 0.0935 -0.0054 0.1905 0.5934 – – 0.3087 0.0014
(2.1865) (1.0351) (2.8037) (1.3260) (-0.1527) (4.4024) (3.7006)
0.0008 0.0595 0.1059 0.1267 -0.0284 0.1570 – 0.2635 0.7152 0.2937 0.0014
(1.5067) (2.0321) (3.0559) (2.0720) (-0.8533) (3.4657) (1.9368) (3.0611)
Table 8: The Merrill Lynch Industry Investment-Grade and High-Yield Corporate Bond Portfolios This table reports
the results of the time-series regressions of weekly realized excess returns of 4 IG Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted by
broad industry and of 30 HY Merrill Lynch corporate bond portfolios sorted by sector on MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, and
DEF. Speciﬁcally, for each portfolio we estimate the regression: R(t)−RF(t) = α+βMKTMKT(t)+βSMBSMB(t)+βHMLHML(t)+
βUMDUMD(t) + βTERMTERM(t) + βDEFDEF(t) + ￿(t). We also report the estimation results after replacing DEF by NDEF and
DRP. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. All ﬁgures are median values
across portfolios. The sample period is October 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
4
9α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD βTERM βDEF βNDEF βDRP R2
100 Fama-French Equity Portfolios
0.0000 1.0581 0.5761 0.2618 -0.0286 -0.0028 -0.0002 – – 0.8507
(-0.0313) (25.2910) (7.3920) (2.9639) (-0.4961) (-0.0481) (0.0001)
-0.0001 1.0582 0.5749 0.2552 -0.0293 -0.0026 – 0.0362 -0.0358 0.8504
(-0.2026) (24.7153) (7.6078) (2.9925) (-0.5681) (-0.0547) (0.0909) (-0.1265)
49 Fama-French Industry Portfolios
0.0004 0.9763 0.2251 0.0867 0.0995 -0.0101 -0.0247 – – 0.6107
(0.3038) (13.9128) (2.1090) (0.5032) (0.9198) (-0.0870) (-0.0584)
0.0004 0.9543 0.2400 0.0632 0.0935 0.0151 – -0.0907 0.1175 0.6114
(0.3456) (13.9297) (2.1393) (0.5122) (0.7333) (0.2012) (-0.1415) (0.2954)
Table 9: The 100 Fama-French Equity and the 49 Fama-French Industry Portfolios This table reports the results of the
time-series regressions of weekly realized excess returns of 100 Fama and French equity portfolios sorted on ﬁrm size and book-to-market
equity and of the 49 Fama-French industry portfolios on MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, and DEF. Speciﬁcally, for each portfolio
we estimate the regression: R(t)−RF(t) = α+βMKTMKT(t)+βSMBSMB(t)+βHMLHML(t)+βUMDUMD(t)+βTERMTERM(t)+
βDEFDEF(t)+￿(t). We also report the estimation results after replacing DEF by NDEF and DRP. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted
for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. All ﬁgures are median values across portfolios. The sample period is
October 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
5
0Moneyness Option to expire
1st 2nd 3rd-5th ≥ 6th
Average excess returns
0.85-0.9 -0.0092 -0.0051 -0.0028 -0.0009
0.9-0.95 -0.0072 -0.0036 -0.0020 -0.0008
0.95-1 -0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0005
> 1 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0003
Loadings on DRP factor
0.85-0.9 -0.4245 -0.1598 -0.0732 0.0991
(-1.8182) (-0.6695) (-0.3841) (0.6326)
0.9-0.95 -0.4326 -0.2149 -0.0683 0.0596
(-1.3396) (-1.1729) (-0.4605) (0.4757)
0.95-1 -0.3521 -0.1849 -0.0711 0.0699
(-1.2295) (-1.4245) (-0.6400) (0.6412)
> 1 -0.1439 -0.0680 -0.0246 0.0654
(-0.9364) (-0.9373) (-0.3435) (1.1035)
Loadings on ∆log(V IX)
0.85-0.9 0.1017 0.0868 0.0755 0.0537
(6.8200) (8.1852) (9.2116) (8.7100)
0.9-0.95 0.0800 0.0768 0.0652 0.0461
(7.1673) (8.2425) (9.1908) (9.2257)
0.95-1 0.0706 0.0597 0.0516 0.0400
(7.1483) (7.9446) (8.9274) (8.5776)
> 1 0.0284 0.0282 0.0264 0.0229
(6.7876) (7.3996) (8.1611) (8.9021)
Table 10: The Index Put Options Portfolios This table reports the results of
the time-series regressions of weekly realized excess returns of 16 value-weighted delta-
hedged index put options portfolios sorted on moneyness and time-to-maturity on MKT,
SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, and DRP. We also includes changes in logV IX as a
covariate. Speciﬁcally, for each portfolio we estimate the regression: R(t) − RF(t) =
α+βMKTMKT(t)+βSMBSMB(t)+βHMLHML(t)+βUMDUMD(t)+βTERMTERM(t)+
βNDEFNDEF(t) + βDRPDRP(t) + βV IX∆logV IX(t) + ￿(t). Newey-West t-statistics ad-
justed for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample period
is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
51Factors γ0 γMKT γSMB γHML γUMD γTERM γNDEF γDRP R2
Corporate bonds
DRP 0.0678 – – – – – – 0.0634 0.1344
0.0661 0.0711
(0.0478) (0.0221)




DRP 0.2642 – – – – – – 0.0252 0.0430
0.3040 0.0124
(0.0988) (0.0224)
MKT and DRP 0.3692 -0.0274 – – – – – 0.0090 0.1066
0.3176 -0.0434 0.0205
(0.0842) (0.1060) (0.0218)
all 0.3855 -0.0997 0.1237 0.1643 0.1241 -0.1213 0.0300 0.0199 0.2817
0.3140 -0.1023 0.0635 0.0716 -0.1022 0.0193 0.0820 0.0110
(0.0788) (0.2088) (0.0897) (0.0811) (0.1584) (0.1105) (0.0513) (0.0180)
Options
DRP -0.1940 – – – – – – 0.1696 0.3501
-0.1501 0.1507
(0.0352) (0.0501)
MKT and DRP -0.1639 -0.7947 – – – – – 0.1923 0.6504
-0.1336 -1.0024 0.0561
(0.0252) (0.2656) (0.0631)
Table 11: Cross-Sectional Tests by Market This table reports the results in percent of weekly cross-sectional regressions by asset class, using
either the DRP factor loadings only, or MKT and DRP factor loadings. For each regression, the reported intercepts and slopes are the median (ﬁrst
row) and mean (second row) across time. Newey-West standard errors are shown in parentheses. Refer to Table 12 for details on the estimation.
5
2Factors γ0 γMKT γSMB γHML γUMD γTERM γNDEF γDRP R2
Corporate bonds and equity
all 0.1375 0.3000 0.0201 0.1360 0.4421 -0.0193 0.0104 0.0094 0.3986
0.1118 0.2992 0.0222 0.0546 0.1214 -0.0173 0.0777 0.0014
(0.0373) (0.1875) (0.0884) (0.0797) (0.1490) (0.1111) (0.0480) (0.0115)
All assets
all -0.0349 0.5860 -0.0019 0.1340 0.3997 0.1717 0.0646 0.0408 0.4195
-0.0110 0.5692 0.0576 0.0611 0.1994 0.1839 0.1174 0.0265
(0.0250) (0.1789) (0.0888) (0.0797) (0.1526) (0.1097) (0.0518) (0.0108)
Table 12: Cross-Sectional Tests for Multiple Markets This table reports the results (in percent) of weekly cross-sectional regressions across mar-








DRP(t−l)+￿i(t), where the loadings βi
F(t−l) are computed
directly using the formula covt−l(Ri,F)/var(F). We report the median (ﬁrst value) and mean (second value) of the intercepts and slopes of the
cross-sectional regressions across weeks. The reported R2 is the median coeﬃcient of determination of the cross-sectional regressions across weeks.
Newey-West standard errors (with 1 lag) are given in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
5
3∆α ∆R2 βChar βDRP
Characteristics Est tStat Est tStat
EDF -0.0001 0.0029 0.0449 0.6519 0.4313 7.1279
Recovery Rate -0.0016 0.0028 0.0040 0.4768 0.4473 7.5960
Implied Vol -0.0002 0.0020 0.0009 0.4557 0.4278 7.0517
Leverage -0.0004 0.0020 0.0012 0.3334 0.4068 6.7819
Table 13: The Impact of Firm Characteristics This table reports the results of
the regressions of the excess returns of pure default-contingent claims with 1 year to
maturity of 112 ﬁrms on MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, DRP, and a ﬁrm
characteristic ϑ. Speciﬁcally, for each ﬁrm we estimate the regression: Ri
t,h(T) −
RFt = αi + βi
MKT MKT(t) + βi
SMB SMB(t) + βi
HML HML(t) + βi
UMD UMD(t) +
βi
TERM TERM(t) + βi
NDEF NDEF(t) + βi
DRP DRP(t) + βi
Char ϑi(t − h) + ￿i
ϑ(t). We
report the median across ﬁrms of the change in the intercept and the R2 due to the
characteristic, as well as summary statistics of the loadings on the characteristic and
the default risk premia factor. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to October 11,
2006.
D The DRP Components
54one default-related component two default-related compts
Name βDRP βDRP L βDRP JtD βDRP MPR βDRP L βDRP −L
Bloomberg-NASD Portfolios
IG 0.9947 2.3244 1.3918 2.5093 1.9374 0.7984
(13.3886) (8.6889) (8.4300) (9.8090) (9.6777) (10.5035)
HY 2.4944 2.5198 4.5389 6.6943 1.1782 2.7685
(8.5218) (2.9758) (10.2952) (5.6553) (2.4165) (8.0216)
ML Rating Portfolios
AAA 0.2180 0.2943 0.2759 0.4294 0.2852 0.1816
(4.3125) (2.4419) (3.0769) (2.0514) (2.6434) (2.9071)
AA 0.2090 0.2566 0.2940 0.4119 0.2472 0.1883
(4.4938) (2.1662) (3.7941) (2.6725) (2.3616) (3.3231)
A 0.2985 0.2374 0.5370 0.6889 0.2204 0.3408
(5.8592) (2.3049) (7.3027) (3.9867) (2.6910) (6.4185)
BAA 0.6698 0.1546 1.5358 1.8781 0.1060 0.9749
(4.4123) (0.8341) (18.8489) (5.9564) (0.9317) (14.5689)
BA 1.3825 0.5822 2.6308 2.9412 0.0069 1.6296
(5.5121) (1.2422) (4.9563) (5.0229) (0.0126) (4.8297)
B 1.5643 0.9644 2.8333 3.4812 0.3341 1.7854
(7.7088) (2.4412) (9.5794) (5.8354) (0.7608) (8.5783)
C 1.5633 1.1344 2.7203 3.6593 0.5161 1.7514
(5.3211) (1.3414) (4.2146) (4.2890) (0.6027) (4.5795)
ML Maturity Portfolios
1-3yrs 0.2388 0.2226 0.3829 0.5788 0.2099 0.2545
(3.7913) (1.4210) (4.6226) (3.2789) (1.5038) (4.6263)
3-5yrs 0.3645 0.2989 0.6318 0.8833 0.2784 0.4111
(4.4815) (1.5227) (6.1370) (3.9102) (1.6701) (5.7381)
5-7yrs 0.4249 0.2654 0.8248 1.0544 0.2391 0.5255
(4.7231) (1.5487) (8.3258) (4.7893) (1.7459) (7.3197)
7-10yrs 0.5057 0.2517 1.0458 1.2866 0.2187 0.6611
(5.2430) (1.6420) (10.9020) (4.6506) (2.0718) (9.3790)
10-15yrs 0.5312 0.3183 1.0473 1.3155 0.2851 0.6643
(5.7913) (2.4928) (6.8088) (5.3341) (3.4522) (6.1017)
15+yrs 0.6118 0.0059 1.5487 1.7493 -0.0423 0.9658
(5.0511) (0.0837) (30.3014) (6.4455) (-0.4940) (14.6657)
ML IG Broad Industry Portfolios
0.2874 0.3647 0.4534 0.6265 0.3575 0.2919
(4.4872) (2.1380) (3.5166) (3.4160) (2.5097) (3.7765)
ML HY Sector Portfolios
0.7152 0.1902 1.6650 1.9520 0.1263 1.0519
(3.0611) (0.9485) (4.2014) (2.7291) (0.8381) (3.9328)
Table 14: Corporate Bond Portfolios This table reports the results of the time-series regressions
of weekly realized excess returns of various corporate bond portfolios on MKT, SMB, HML,
UMD, TERM, and DRP. The ﬁrst column summarizes the results for the DRP factor reported
in Tables 5 through 8. The next three columns report these estimates after replacing DRP with
DRP L, DRP JtD and DRP MPR, respectively. The last two columns show the estimation results
after replacing DRP by DRP L and DRP −L. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity
(with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006,
except for the Bloomberg-NASD portfolios which where initiated in October 2002.
55Loading Moneyness Option to expire
1st 2nd 3rd-5th ≥ 6th
βDRP L 0.85-0.9 -0.4161 0.0838 0.2806 0.4842
(-1.8391) (0.3535) (1.4139) (2.6901)
0.9-0.95 -0.3341 0.0827 0.2290 0.4162
(-1.0375) (0.5052) (1.4462) (2.8161)
0.95-1 -0.0091 0.1079 0.2305 0.4116
(-0.0330) (0.8897) (1.7927) (2.8185)
1-1.05 0.0478 0.0791 0.1747 0.3085
(0.2717) (0.8436) (2.0271) (2.8194)
βDRP JtD 0.85-0.9 -0.4873 -0.3982 -0.3859 -0.1965
(-0.6045) (-0.7929) (-0.9314) (-0.7231)
0.9-0.95 -0.5276 -0.5091 -0.3444 -0.2145
(-0.6141) (-1.1994) (-1.0520) (-0.9292)
0.95-1 -0.8086 -0.4950 -0.3493 -0.1958
(-1.4546) (-1.5835) (-1.3990) (-1.0054)
1-1.05 -0.3782 -0.2151 -0.1979 -0.1129
(-1.3189) (-1.2600) (-1.3526) (-0.9742)
βDRP MPR 0.85-0.9 -1.9833 -0.8011 -0.6071 -0.0673
(-2.3205) (-0.9233) (-0.8575) (-0.1027)
0.9-0.95 -2.2344 -1.0411 -0.4968 -0.1932
(-2.1656) (-1.5995) (-0.8769) (-0.3861)
0.95-1 -1.9270 -0.8524 -0.5172 -0.1228
(-2.3433) (-1.8773) (-1.2992) (-0.2600)
1-1.05 -0.8822 -0.3528 -0.2827 -0.0606
(-2.5888) (-1.7760) (-1.6232) (-0.3336)
βDRP L 0.85-0.9 -0.3105 0.1006 0.2961 0.4906
(-1.5144) (0.4503) (1.4928) (2.7052)
0.9-0.95 -0.2294 0.1046 0.2423 0.4240
(-0.9099) (0.6547) (1.4887) (2.8197)
0.95-1 0.1061 0.1279 0.2441 0.4183
(0.5446) (0.9457) (1.7387) (2.7738)
1-1.05 0.1025 0.0876 0.1824 0.3124
(0.7360) (0.8441) (1.9180) (2.7135)
βDRP −L 0.85-0.9 -0.5250 -0.3032 -0.2742 -0.1140
(-1.2391) (-0.9578) (-1.1220) (-0.6374)
0.9-0.95 -0.5835 -0.3888 -0.2374 -0.1388
(-1.1800) (-1.5220) (-1.2319) (-0.9961)
0.95-1 -0.6892 -0.3552 -0.2427 -0.1197
(-2.0216) (-1.8997) (-1.7052) (-1.0060)
1-1.05 -0.3254 -0.1527 -0.1373 -0.0695
(-1.9219) (-1.5130) (-1.5978) (-1.1055)
Table 15: Index Put Options Portfolios This table reports the results of the time-series re-
gressions of weekly realized excess returns of 16 value-weighted delta-hedged index put option bond
portfolios on MKT, SMB, HML, UMD, TERM, and ∆logV IX. We also include either DRP L,
DRP JtD or DRP MPR as a covariate. The last two columns show the estimation results when DRP L
and DRP −L are included in the regression. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity
(with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006,
except for the Bloomberg-NASD portfolios which where initiated in October 2002.
56Factors single dﬂt-rltd component two default-rltd components
γDRP γDRP L γDRP JtD γDRP MPR γDRP L γDRP −L
Corporate bonds
dﬂt-rltd 0.0634 -0.0105 0.0338 0.0166 -0.0060 0.0586
0.0711 -0.0046 0.0267 0.0241 -0.0068 0.0493
(0.0221) (0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0082) (0.0134) (0.0177)
plus MKT 0.0291 -0.0075 0.0123 0.0048 -0.0098 0.0220
0.0115 -0.0118 0.0038 0.0037 -0.0121 0.0044
(0.0197) (0.0084) (0.0144) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0231)
Equity
dﬂt-rltd 0.0252 0.0124 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0124 0.0021
0.0124 0.0083 0.0030 0.0042 0.0019 0.0047
(0.0224) (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0074) (0.0105) (0.0188)
plus MKT 0.0090 0.0200 -0.0039 -0.0059 0.0165 -0.0044
0.0205 0.0101 0.0066 0.0030 0.0020 0.0102
(0.0218) (0.0105) (0.0112) (0.0071) (0.0106) (0.0176)
Options
dﬂt-rltd 0.1696 0.0031 0.0855 0.0471 0.0285 0.1928
0.1507 -0.0343 0.1020 0.0355 -0.0144 0.1378
(0.0501) (0.0528) (0.0323) (0.0138) (0.0666) (0.0563)
plus MKT 0.1923 -0.0345 0.0773 0.0328 0.0306 0.2149
0.0561 -0.0960 0.0453 0.0117 -0.0797 0.1611
(0.0631) (0.0538) (0.0303) (0.0162) (0.0612) (0.0463)
All assets
all 0.0408 0.0112 0.0244 0.0132 0.0106 0.0396
0.0265 0.0081 0.0190 0.0090 0.0060 0.0258
(0.0108) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0040) (0.0077) (0.0097)
Table 16: Cross-sectional Tests This table reports the results (in percent) of weekly cross-
sectional regressions in (16). The ﬁrst column summarizes the results for the DRP factor reported
in Tables 11 and 12. The next three columns report these estimates after replacing DRP with
DRP L, DRP JtD and DRP MPR, respectively. The last two columns show the estimation results
after replacing DRP by DRP L and DRP −L. We report the median (ﬁrst value) and mean (second
value) of the intercepts and slopes of the cross-sectional regressions across weeks. The reported R2 is
the median coeﬃcient of determination of the cross-sectional regressions across weeks. Newey-West
standard errors (with 1 lag) are given in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to
October 11, 2006.
E Asset Pricing Test Results using CDS Returns
57one default-related component two default-related compts
Name βCDRP βCDRP L βCDRP JtD βCDRP MPR βCDRP L βCDRP −L
Bloomberg-NASD Portfolios
IG 0.0332 0.0081 0.0337 0.0603 0.0449 0.0334
(5.5044) (0.8317) (5.0476) (4.0012) (3.6170) (5.5230)
HY 0.1294 -0.0108 0.1340 0.3112 0.1316 0.1295
(8.3823) (-0.4238) (7.1915) (6.6907) (4.8094) (8.3939)
ML Rating Portfolios
AAA 0.0085 -0.0090 0.0117 0.0149 -0.0001 0.0084
(2.7310) (-1.5730) (3.3237) (1.8127) (-0.0118) (2.6794)
AA 0.0081 -0.0110 0.0121 0.0112 -0.0026 0.0079
(2.8542) (-2.0732) (4.1233) (1.3373) (-0.4195) (2.7809)
A 0.0178 -0.0106 0.0216 0.0337 0.0083 0.0177
(5.4611) (-1.7637) (6.5782) (4.2842) (1.4017) (5.3876)
BAA 0.0516 -0.0057 0.0554 0.0956 0.0493 0.0516
(8.6212) (-0.6131) (9.4859) (6.8012) (5.4626) (8.6127)
BA 0.0979 0.0025 0.0991 0.2137 0.1061 0.0980
(5.3950) (0.1604) (4.9643) (7.2775) (4.3413) (5.4014)
B 0.1062 0.0070 0.1054 0.2390 0.1194 0.1064
(8.6621) (0.4068) (7.7914) (7.2813) (5.3594) (8.6648)
C 0.1504 0.0148 0.1443 0.3685 0.1741 0.1507
(9.4498) (0.4116) (5.8680) (8.8809) (4.7927) (9.5727)
ML Maturity Portfolios
1-3yrs 0.0096 -0.0073 0.0133 0.0075 0.0028 0.0095
(3.1519) (-1.3526) (4.1679) (0.9752) (0.4647) (3.0900)
3-5yrs 0.0163 -0.0127 0.0218 0.0205 0.0045 0.0162
(3.7297) (-1.6524) (4.8707) (1.8128) (0.5356) (3.6711)
5-7yrs 0.0267 -0.0126 0.0316 0.0478 0.0157 0.0265
(5.5620) (-1.4113) (6.4411) (3.9455) (1.7459) (5.5174)
7-10yrs 0.0333 -0.0079 0.0375 0.0572 0.0275 0.0332
(5.8066) (-0.9066) (6.7051) (4.2745) (3.1907) (5.7941)
10-15yrs 0.0287 -0.0001 0.0315 0.0393 0.0305 0.0287
(4.6295) (-0.0128) (5.1591) (3.0672) (2.7024) (4.6253)
15+yrs 0.0619 -0.0038 0.0631 0.1369 0.0622 0.0619
(13.9868) (-0.4385) (12.4390) (11.9418) (8.9966) (13.9795)
ML IG Broad Industry Portfolios
0.0155 -0.0100 0.0188 0.0157 0.0063 0.0153
(2.6375) (-1.5034) (3.1334) (1.1628) (0.8531) (2.6238)
ML HY Sector Portfolios
0.0816 -0.0044 0.0800 0.2258 0.0881 0.0812
(7.0487) (-0.2258) (5.1234) (6.1938) (2.9496) (7.0955)
Table 17: Corporate Bond Portfolios This table reports the results of the time-series regres-
sions in (15) for various corporate bond portfolios when using the return deﬁnition in (23). The ﬁrst
column summarizes the results for the CDRP factor. The next three columns report these esti-
mates after replacing CDRP with CDRP L, CDRP JtD and CDRP MPR, respectively. The last two
columns show the estimation results after replacing CDRP by CDRP L and CDRP −L. Newey-West
t-statistics adjusted for heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample pe-
riod is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006, except for the Bloomberg-NASD portfolios which where
initiated in October 2002.
58Loading Moneyness Time to Expiration
1st 2nd 3rd-5th ≥ 6th
βCDRP 0.85-0.9 -0.0295 -0.0260 -0.0260 -0.0304
(-1.0590) (-1.4775) (-2.0116) (-3.6708)
0.9-0.95 -0.0250 -0.0292 -0.0215 -0.0243
(-1.3949) (-1.8833) (-2.0624) (-3.4661)
0.95-1 -0.0350 -0.0215 -0.0160 -0.0194
(-2.4247) (-2.0591) (-2.1137) (-3.1144)
1-1.05 -0.0234 -0.0092 -0.0085 -0.0081
(-2.4675) (-1.7661) (-1.6991) (-1.9060)
βCDRP L 0.85-0.9 -0.1578 -0.0316 -0.0079 0.0015
(-1.5999) (-0.9592) (-0.3619) (0.0841)
0.9-0.95 -0.0911 -0.0174 -0.0065 0.0001
(-1.2096) (-0.7530) (-0.3538) (0.0068)
0.95-1 -0.1214 0.0029 0.0037 0.0033
(-2.0936) (0.1647) (0.2556) (0.2482)
1-1.05 -0.0912 0.0152 0.0124 0.0091
(-2.2350) (1.3488) (1.2985) (0.9956)
βCDRP JtD 0.85-0.9 -0.0224 -0.0222 -0.0253 -0.0280
(-0.6018) (-1.2501) (-2.0545) (-3.0654)
0.9-0.95 -0.0295 -0.0259 -0.0212 -0.0230
(-1.2350) (-1.6676) (-2.0535) (-2.9700)
0.95-1 -0.0421 -0.0246 -0.0191 -0.0199
(-2.2355) (-2.2648) (-2.3977) (-3.0001)
1-1.05 -0.0245 -0.0143 -0.0128 -0.0109
(-2.2383) (-2.3638) (-2.3755) (-2.3064)
βCDRP MPR 0.85-0.9 0.0410 -0.0282 -0.0438 -0.0920
(0.4184) (-0.5103) (-1.1080) (-3.1587)
0.9-0.95 -0.0241 -0.0488 -0.0341 -0.0656
(-0.5395) (-1.0358) (-1.1434) (-2.7692)
0.95-1 -0.0348 -0.0277 -0.0180 -0.0478
(-0.9644) (-0.9805) (-0.9159) (-2.3469)
1-1.05 -0.0370 -0.0144 -0.0119 -0.0165
(-1.3589) (-1.0013) (-0.8540) (-1.2042)
Table 18: Index Put Options Portfolios This table reports the results of the time-series
regressions in (15) for 16 value-weighted delta-hedged index put option portfolios when
using the return deﬁnition in (23). The ﬁrst column summarizes the results for the CDRP
factor. The next three columns report these estimates after replacing CDRP with CDRPL,
CDRPJtD and CDRPMPR, respectively. The last two columns show the estimation results
after replacing CDRP by CDRPL and CDRP−L. Newey-West t-statistics adjusted for
heteroscedasticity (with 3 lags) are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January
2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
59Factors single dﬂt-rltd component two default-rltd components
γCDRP γCDRP L γCDRP JtD γCDRP MPR γCDRP L γCDRP −L
Corporate bonds
dﬂt-rltd 0.8155 -0.0249 1.0672 0.2442 0.5153 1.1946
0.6594 -0.0692 0.6515 0.1865 0.1710 0.7355
(0.4133) (0.4473) (0.4760) (0.1373) (0.3682) (0.5427)
plus MKT 0.2677 0.4007 0.1205 0.0611 0.5061 0.3872
0.1919 0.0658 0.2454 0.0416 0.1000 0.3068
(0.4235) (0.3243) (0.4552) (0.1397) (0.3448) (0.5617)
Equity
dﬂt-rltd 0.1088 0.3317 0.0013 0.0304 0.2143 0.3602
-0.0675 0.1707 -0.2524 0.0115 0.1743 -0.0165
(0.3229) (0.1808) (0.3517) (0.0947) (0.1862) (0.3569)
plus MKT -0.0292 0.2180 0.0787 -0.0081 0.1963 -0.0522
0.0256 0.1555 -0.2364 0.0267 0.1431 0.0377
(0.2780) (0.1493) (0.2583) (0.0777) (0.1622) (0.3348)
Options
dﬂt-rltd 3.6058 -0.5178 1.8229 0.2807 -0.2287 3.3980
2.8957 -1.4498 1.4023 0.2038 -1.1121 1.6852
(0.7640) (0.7069) (0.7797) (0.2216) (0.5713) (0.8537)
plus MKT 2.9164 -0.3291 1.8907 0.7536 0.0547 3.2913
2.8698 -0.4261 1.6274 0.8302 0.5882 2.2043
(0.6304) (0.6383) (0.6954) (0.1877) (0.5194) (0.8195)
All assets
all 0.7344 0.0458 0.4003 0.1668 0.2544 0.7558
0.4812 0.1450 0.2590 0.1515 0.2380 0.5827
(0.1556) (0.1244) (0.1707) (0.0492) (0.1321) (0.2136)
Table 19: Cross-sectional Tests his table reports the results (in percent) of weekly cross-sectional
regressions in (16). The ﬁrst column summarizes the results for the CDRP factor. The next three
columns report these estimates after replacing CDRP with CDRP L, CDRP JtD and CDRP MPR,
respectively. The last two columns show the estimation results after replacing CDRP by CDRP L
and CDRP −L. We report the median (ﬁrst value) and mean (second value) of the intercepts and
slopes of the cross-sectional regressions across weeks. The reported R2 is the median coeﬃcient of
determination of the cross-sectional regressions across weeks. Newey-West standard errors (with 1
lag) are given in parentheses. The sample period is January 2, 2002 to October 11, 2006.
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